Counterfactual Explanations without Opening the Black Box: Automated
  Decisions and the GDPR by Wachter, Sandra et al.
COUNTERFACTUAL EXPLANATIONS WITHOUT 
OPENING THE BLACK BOX: AUTOMATED DECISIONS 
AND THE GDPR 
Sandra Wachter,* Brent Mittelstadt,** & Chris Russell*** 
 
 
 
                                               
* Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, 1 St. Giles, Oxford, OX1 3JS, UK and 
The Alan Turing Institute, British Library, 96 Euston Road, London, NW1 2DB, UK. E-
mail: sandra.wachter@oii.ox.ac.uk. This work was supported by The Alan Turing 
Institute under the EPSRC grant EP/N510129/1. 
** Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, 1 St. Giles, Oxford, OX1 3JS, UK, 
The Alan Turing Institute, British Library, 96 Euston Road, London, NW1 2DB, UK, 
Department of Science and Technology Studies, University College London, 22 Gordon 
Square, London, WC1E 6BT, UK. 
*** The Alan Turing Institute, British Library, 96 Euston Road, London, NW1 2DB, UK, 
Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, University of Surrey, Guildford, 
GU2 7HX, UK. 
2 COUNTERFACTUAL EXPLANATIONS  
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Introduction ........................................................................................ 3 
II. Counterfactuals ................................................................................. 5 
A. Historic Context and The Problem of Knowledge ........................... 7 
B. Explanations in A.I. and Machine Learning .................................. 10 
C. Adversarial Perturbations and Counterfactual Explanations ....... 13 
D. Causality and Fairness .................................................................. 15 
III. Generating Counterfactuals ........................................................... 16 
A. LSAT dataset .................................................................................. 18 
B. Pima Diabetes Database ................................................................ 20 
C. Causal Assumptions and Counterfactual Explanations ................ 21 
IV. Advantages of Counterfactual Explanations .................................. 22 
V. Counterfactual explanations and the GDPR ................................... 23 
A. Explanations to understand decisions ........................................... 25 
1. Broader possibilities with the right of access ............................ 32 
2. Understanding through counterfactuals .................................... 34 
B. Explanations to contest decisions .................................................. 35 
1. Contesting through counterfactuals .......................................... 40 
C. Explanations to alter future decisions ........................................... 42 
Conclusion .......................................................................................... 43 
Appendix 1: Simple Local Models as Explanations ............................. 48 
Appendix 2: Example Transparency Infographic ................................. 51 
 
 
3 COUNTERFACTUAL EXPLANATIONS  
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There has been much discussion of the existence of a “right to 
explanation” in the EU General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), 
and its merits and disadvantages.1 Attempts to implement a right to 
explanation that opens the “black box” to provide insight into the internal 
decision-making process of algorithms face four major legal and technical 
barriers. First, a legally binding right to explanation does not exist in the 
GDPR.2 Second, even if legally binding, the right would only apply in 
limited cases (when a negative decision was solely automated and had 
legal or other similar significant effects).3 Third, explaining the 
functionality of complex algorithmic decision-making systems and their 
rationale in specific cases is a technically challenging problem.4 
Explanations may likewise offer little meaningful information to data 
subjects, raising questions about their value.5 Finally, data controllers 
have an interest in not sharing details of their algorithms to avoid 
                                               
1 See, e.g., Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Luciano Floridi, Why a Right to 
Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General Data 
Protection Regulation, 7 INT’L DATA PRIV. LAW 76, 79–90 (2017); Isak Mendoza & Lee 
A. Bygrave, The Right Not to Be Subject to Automated Decisions Based on Profiling, in 
EU INTERNET LAW: REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT (Tatiani Synodinou et al. eds., 
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2964855 [https://perma.cc/XV3T-G98W]; 
Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a ‘Right to Explanation’ 
is Probably Not the Remedy You are Looking For, 16 DUKE L. TECH. REV. 18, 18–19 
(2017); Tae Wan Kim & Bryan Routledge, Algorithmic Transparency, a Right to 
Explanation, and Placing Trust, SQUARESPACE (June 2017), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/592ee286d482e908d35b8494/t/59552415579fb3
0c014cd06c/1498752022120/Algorithmic+transparency%2C+a+right+to+explanation+
and+trust+%28TWK%26BR%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/K53W-GVN2]; Gianclaudio 
Malgieri & Giovanni Comandé, Why a Right to Legibility of Automated Decision-
Making Exists in the General Data Protection Regulation, 7 INT’L DATA PRIV. L. 243, 
246–47 (2017); Bryce Goodman & Seth Flaxman, EU Regulations on Algorithmic 
Decision-Making and a “Right to Explanation,” ARXIV:1606.08813, at 6–7 (2016), 
http://arxiv.org/abs/1606.08813 [https://perma.cc/5ZTR-WG8R]; Andrew Selbst & 
Julia Powles, Meaningful Information and the Right to Explanation, 7 INT’L DATA PRIV. 
L. 233, 233–34 (2017). 
2 Wachter, Mittelstadt & Floridi, supra note 1, at 79; Kim & Routledge, supra note 1, at 
3. 
3 Wachter, Mittelstadt & Floridi, supra note 1, at 78. 
4 See, e.g., Wachter, Mittelstadt & Floridi, supra note 1, at 77; Edwards & Veale, supra 
note 1, at 22; Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 
638 (2016); Tal Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1519–20 
(2013). 
5 Jenna Burrell, How the Machine “Thinks:” Understanding Opacity in Machine 
Learning Algorithms, BIG DATA & SOC., Jan.–June 2016, at 5; Kroll et al., supra note 4, 
at 638. 
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disclosing trade secrets, violating the rights and freedoms of others (e.g. 
privacy), and allowing data subjects to game or manipulate the decision-
making system.6  
Despite these difficulties, the social and ethical value (and perhaps 
responsibility) of offering explanations to affected data subjects remains 
unaffected. One significant point has been neglected in this discussion. 
An explanation of automated decisions, both as envisioned by the GDPR 
and in general, does not necessarily hinge on the general public 
understanding of how algorithmic systems function. Even though such 
interpretability is of great importance and should be pursued, explanations 
can, in principle, be offered without opening the “black box.” Looking at 
explanations as a means to help a data subject act rather than merely 
understand, one could gauge the scope and content of explanations 
according to the specific goal or action they are intended to support. 
Explanations can serve many purposes. To investigate the 
potential scope of explanations, it seems reasonable to start from the 
perspective of the data subject, which is the natural person whose data is 
being collected and evaluated. We propose three aims for explanations to 
assist data subjects: (1) to inform and help the subject understand why a 
particular decision was reached, (2) to provide grounds to contest adverse 
decisions, and (3) to understand what could be changed to receive a 
desired result in the future, based on the current decision-making model.  
As we show, the GDPR offers little support to achieve any of these aims. 
However, none hinge on explaining the internal logic of automated 
decision-making systems.  
Building trust is essential to increase societal acceptance of 
algorithmic decision-making. As a solution to close current gaps in 
transparency and accountability that undermine trust between data 
controllers and data subjects,7 we propose to move beyond the limitations 
                                               
6 Burrell, supra note 5, at 3; Brenda Reddix-Smalls, Credit Scoring and Trade Secrecy: 
An Algorithmic Quagmire or How the Lack of Transparency in Complex Financial 
Models Scuttled the Finance Market, 12 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 87, 94 (2011); Mike 
Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing without knowing: Limitations of the Transparency 
Ideal and its Application to Algorithmic Accountability, NEW MEDIA & SOC., 2016, at 8, 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1461444816676645 
[https://perma.cc/3HF6-G9DS]; Roger A. Ford & W. Nicholson Price II, Privacy and 
Accountability in Black-Box Medicine, 23 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. REV. 1, 3 (2016); 
Frank A. Pasquale, Restoring Transparency to Automated Authority, 9 J. TELECOMM. 
HIGH TECH. L. 235, 237 (2011). 
7 Wachter, Mittelstadt & Floridi, supra note 1, at 78; Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 
1, at 97. 
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of the GDPR. We argue that counterfactuals should be used as a means to 
provide explanations for individual decisions. 
 Unconditional counterfactual explanations should be given for 
positive and negative automated decisions, regardless of whether the 
decisions are solely (as opposed to predominantly) automated or produce 
legal or other significant effects. This approach provides data subjects 
with meaningful explanations to understand a given decision, grounds to 
contest it, and advice on how the data subject can change his or her 
behaviour or situation to possibly receive a desired decision (e.g. loan 
approval) in the future without facing the severely limited applicability 
imposed by the GDPR’s definition of automated individual decision-
making.8 
 In this paper, we present the concept of unconditional 
counterfactual explanations as a novel type of explanation of automated 
decisions that overcomes many challenges facing current work on 
algorithmic interpretability and accountability. We situate counterfactuals 
in the philosophical history of knowledge, as well as historical and 
modern research on interpretability and fairness in machine learning. 
Based on the potential advantages offered to data subjects by 
counterfactual explanations, we then assess their alignment with the 
GDPR’s numerous provisions concerning automated decision-making. 
Specifically, we examine whether the GDPR offers support for 
explanations that aim to help data subjects understand the scope of 
automated decision-making as well as the rationale of specific decisions, 
explanations to contest decisions, and explanations that offer guidance on 
how data subjects can change their behaviour to receive a desired result. 
We conclude that unconditional counterfactual explanations can bridge 
the gap between the interests of data subjects and data controllers that 
otherwise acts as a barrier to a legally binding right to explanation. 
II. COUNTERFACTUALS 
Counterfactual explanations take a similar form to the statement: 
 
“You were denied a loan because your annual income was £30,000. If 
your income had been £45,000, you would have been offered a loan.” 
 
                                               
8 Wachter, Mittelstadt & Floridi, supra note 1, at 87–88; Mendoza & Bygrave, supra 
note 1, at 83; Edwards & Veale, supra note 1, at 22. 
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Here the statement of decision is followed by a counterfactual, or 
statement of how the world would have to be different for a desirable 
outcome to occur. Multiple counterfactuals are possible, as multiple 
desirable outcomes can exist, and there may be several ways to achieve 
any of these outcomes. The concept of the “closest possible world,” or the 
smallest change to the world that can be made to obtain a desirable 
outcome, is key throughout the discussion of counterfactuals. In many 
situations, providing several explanations covering a range of diverse 
counterfactuals corresponding to relevant or informative “close possible 
worlds” rather than “the closest possible world” may be more helpful.  
Knowing the smallest possible change to a variable or set of variables to 
arrive at a different outcome may not always be the most helpful type of 
counterfactual. Rather, relevance will depend also upon other case-
specific factors, such as the mutability of a variable or real world 
probability of a change.9  
In the existing literature, “explanation” typically refers to an 
attempt to convey the internal state or logic of an algorithm that leads to 
a decision.10 In contrast, counterfactuals describe a dependency on the 
external facts that led to that decision. This is a crucial distinction. In 
modern machine learning, the internal state of the algorithm can consist 
of millions of variables intricately connected in a large web of dependent 
behaviours.11 Conveying this state to a layperson in a way that allows 
them to reason about the behaviour of an algorithm is extremely 
challenging.12 
The machine learning and legal communities have both taken 
relatively restricted views on what passes for an explanation. The machine 
learning community has been primarily concerned with debugging13 and 
conveying approximations of algorithms that programmers or researchers 
                                               
9 See infra, Section II.A. 
10 See Burrell, supra note 5, at 1. 
11 See, e.g., Kaiming He et al., Deep Residual Learning for Image Recognition, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER VISION AND PATTERN 
RECOGNITION 770–78 (2016). 
12 See Burrell, supra note 5, at 1; Zachary C. Lipton, The Mythos of Model 
Interpretability, in 2016 WORKSHOP ON HUMAN INTERPRETABILITY IN MACHINE 
LEARNING 96, 
http://zacklipton.com/media/papers/mythos_model_interpretability_lipton2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4JVZ-7T6D]. 
13 Osbert Bastani, Carolyn Kim & Hamsa Bastani, Interpretability via Model Extraction, 
AʀXɪᴠ:1706.09773, at 1 (2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1611.07450.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8J3J-RE2T]. 
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could use to understand which features are important14 while law and 
ethics scholars have been more concerned with understanding the internal 
logic of decisions as a means to assess their lawfulness (e.g. prevent 
discriminatory outcomes), contest them, increase accountability 
generally, and clarify liability.15  
As such, the proposal made here for counterfactuals as 
explanations lies outside of the taxonomies of explanations proposed 
previously in machine learning, legal, and ethical literature. In contrast, 
as we discuss in the next section, analytic philosophy has taken a much 
broader view of knowledge and how counterfactuals can be used as 
justifications of beliefs.16  
A. HISTORIC CONTEXT AND THE PROBLEM OF 
KNOWLEDGE 
Analytic Philosophy has a long history of analysing the necessary 
conditions for propositional knowledge.17 Expressions of the type “S 
                                               
14 Marco Tulio Ribeiro, Sameer Singh & Carlos Guestrin, Why Should I Trust You?: 
Explaining the Predictions of Any Classifier,  in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 22ND ACM 
SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA 
MINING 1135 (2016); Ramprasaath R. Selvaraju et al., Grad-CAM: Why Did You Say 
That?, ARXIV:1611.07450, at 1 (2016) , https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.07450 
[https://perma.cc/AA8F-45XJ]; Karen Simonyan, Andrea Vedaldi & Andrew 
Zisserman, Deep inside convolutional networks: Visualising Image Classification 
Models and Saliency Maps, ARXIV:1312.6034, at 1 (2013), 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1312.6034 [https://perma.cc/Y85R-X9UE]. 
15 See, e.g., Finale Doshi-Velez et al., Accountability of AI Under the Law: The Role of 
Explanation, ARXIV:1711.01134, at 1 (2017); Finale Doshi-Velez, Ryan Budish & 
Mason Kortz, The Role of Explanation in Algorithmic Trust, TRUSTWORTHY 
ALGORITHMIC DECISION-MAKING 2, http://trustworthy-
algorithms.org/whitepapers/Finale%20Doshi-Velez.pdf [https://perma.cc/4L88-V58A]; 
Mireille Hildebrandt, The Dawn of a Critical Transparency Right for the Profiling Era, 
in DIGITAL ENLIGHTENMENT YEARBOOK 2012 41 (Jacques Bus et al. eds., 2012); Tim 
Miller, Explanation in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Social Sciences, 
ARXIV:1706.07269, at 3 (2017); Pasquale, supra note 6, at 236; Danielle Keats Citron 
& Frank A. Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2376209 
[https://perma.cc/9CXY-DBTN]; Tal Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. Iʟʟ. L. 
Rᴇᴠ. 1503, 1506–09 (2013), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2324240 [https://perma.cc/F8FC-
YDJG]; Tal Zarsky, The Trouble with Algorithmic Decisions: An Analytic Road Map to 
Examine Efficiency and Fairness in Automated and Opaque Decision Making, 41 SCI. 
TECH. HUM. VALUES 118, 118–132 (2016). 
16 See, e.g., DAVID LEWIS, COUNTERFACTUALS 1–4, 84–91 (1973); David Lewis, 
Counterfactuals and Comparative Possibility, 2 J. PHIL. LOGIC 418, 418–446 (1973); 
Peter Lipton, Contrastive Explanation, 27 ROYAL INST. PHIL. SUPP. 247, 247 (1990); 
ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 172–74 (1981). 
17 See generally ALFRED JULES AYER, THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE (1956). 
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knows that p” constitute knowledge, where S refers to the knowing 
subject, and p to the proposition that is known. Traditional approaches, 
which conceive of knowledge as “justified true belief,” conceive of three 
necessary conditions for knowledge: truth, belief, and justification.18 
According to this tripartite approach, in order to know something, it is not 
enough to simply believe that something is true: rather, you must also 
have a good reason for believing it.19 The relevance of this approach 
comes from the observation that this form of justification of beliefs can 
serve as a type of explanation,20 as it is fundamentally a reason that a 
belief is held and therefore serves as an answer to the question, “Why do 
you believe X?” Understanding the different forms these justifications can 
take opens the door to a broader class of explanations than previously 
encountered in interpretability research. 
Although influential, “justified true belief” has faced much 
criticism21 and inspired substantial analysis of modifications to this 
tripartite approach as well as proposals for additional necessary 
conditions for a proposition to constitute knowledge.22 Modal conditions, 
including safety23 and sensitivity,24 have been proposed as necessary 
additions to the tripartite built on counterfactual relations.25  
 
Sosa26 as well as Ichikawa and Steup27 define sensitivity as: 
 
If p were false, S would not believe that p. 
                                               
18 See generally Edmund L. Gettier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, 23 ANALYSIS 
121 (1963); Julien Dutant, The Legend of the Justified True Belief Analysis, 29 PHIL. 
PERSP. 95 (2015). 
19 See Gettier, supra note 18, at 121. 
20 See NOZICK, supra note 16, at 174. 
21 See, e.g., Dutant, supra note 18, at 95; Mark Kaplan, It’s Not What You Know that 
Counts, 82 J. PHIL. 350, 350 (1985). 
22 Jonathan Ichikawa & Matthias Steup, The Analysis of Knowledge, in STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY ARCHIVE (Fall 2017 ed.), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/knowledge-analysis/ 
[https://perma.cc/6CXB-FTJV]. 
23 See Ernest Sosa, How to Defeat Opposition to Moore, 13 PHIL. PERSP. 141, 141–43 
(1999). 
24 See Jonathan Ichikawa, Quantifiers, Knowledge, and Counterfactuals, 82 PHIL. 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 287, 287 (2011); see also NOZICK, supra note 16, at 172–74. 
25  See Ichikawa & Steup, supra note 22, Section 5 (reviewing these concepts and their 
criticisms). 
26 Sosa, supra note 23, at 141. 
27 Ichikawa & Steup, supra note 22, Section 5.1. 
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Here, the statement “If p were false” is a counterfactual defining a 
“possible world” close to the world in which p is true.28 The sensitivity 
condition suggests that “in the nearest possible worlds in which not-p, the 
subject does not believe that p.”29 Our notion of counterfactual 
explanations hinges upon the related concept: 
If q were false, S would not believe p. 
We claim that in this case, q serves as an explanation of S’s belief in p, 
inasmuch as S only holds belief p while q is true, and that changing q 
would also cause S’s belief to change. A key point is that such statements 
only describe S’s beliefs, which need not reflect reality.30 As such, these 
statements can be made without knowledge of any causal relationship 
between q and p.  
We define Counterfactual Explanations as statements taking the 
form: 
Score p was returned because variables V had values (v1, 
v2,...) associated with them. If V instead had values (v1', 
v2',...), and all other variables had remained constant, score 
p' would have been returned. 
While many such explanations are possible, an ideal counterfactual 
explanation would alter values as little as possible and represent a closest 
world under which score p' is returned instead of p. The notion of a 
“closest possible world” is thus implicit in our definition. 
Our version of counterfactuals perhaps most resembles a 
structural equations approach in execution by identifying alterations to 
variables. This approach is more similar to Pearl’s “mini-surgeries”31 than 
Lewis’ “miracles.”32 In any case, our approach does not rely on 
knowledge of the causal structure of the world,33 or suggest which 
context-dependent metric of distance between worlds is preferable to 
establish causality.34 In many situations, it will be more informative to 
provide a diverse set of counterfactual explanations, corresponding to 
different choices of nearby possible worlds for which the counterfactual 
                                               
28 See LEWIS, supra note 16, at 1–4. 
29 Ichikawa & Steup, supra note 22, Section 5.1. 
30 For example, S could believe that a person is inherently more trustworthy (p) because 
they are a Capricorn (q).  
31 See JUDEA PEARL, CAUSATION 223–24 (2000). 
32 LEWIS, supra note 16, at 47–48. 
33 See infra, Section II.D.  
34 See Boris Kment, Counterfactuals and Explanation, 115 MIND 261, 261–309 (2006). 
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holds or a preferred outcome is delivered, rather than a theoretically ideal 
counterfactual describing the “closest possible world” according to a 
preferred distance metric.35 Case-specific considerations will be relevant 
to the choice of distance metric and a “sufficient” and “relevant” set of 
counterfactual explanations. Such considerations may include the 
capabilities of the individual concerned, sensitivity, mutability of the 
variables involved in a decision, and ethical or legal requirements for 
disclosure.36 
Similarly, counterfactuals that describe changes to multiple 
variables within the model can be provided. These would represent 
possible futures brought about by changes to the individual’s 
circumstances. As an example, the impact of changes in income could be 
calculated in combination with changes to career, thereby ensuring the 
counterfactual represents a realistic possible world. 
B. EXPLANATIONS IN A.I. AND MACHINE LEARNING 
Much of the early work in A.I. on explaining the decisions made by expert 
or rule-based systems focused on classes of explanation closely related to 
counterfactuals. For example, Gregor and Benbasat37 offer the following 
example of what they call a type 1 explanation: 
 
Q: Why is a tax cut appropriate? 
A: Because a tax cut’s preconditions are high inflation and 
trade deficits, and current conditions include these factors. 
 
                                               
35 The merits of different metrics of distance between possible worlds have long been 
debated in philosophy without the emergence of consensus. Meaningfully addressing 
this debate goes beyond the scope of this paper which proposes a method for 
counterfactual explanations, but will be explored in future work. For further discussion 
of distance metrics and counterfactuals, see LEWIS, supra note 16, at 8–15; Ernest W. 
Adams, On the Rightness of Certain Counterfactuals, 74 PAC. PHIL. Q. 1, 1–8 (1993); 
Kment, supra note 34, at 262. 
36 A discussion of appropriate metrics for making these choices goes beyond the scope 
of this paper, but will be addressed in future work. With that said, relevant philosophical 
discussion can be found on determining relevance of possible causal or contrastive 
explanations, counterfactuals, and distance metrics. See, e.g., Peter Lipton, Contrastive 
Explanation, 27 ROYAL INST. PHIL. SUPP. 247, 254–65 (1990); Adams, supra note 35, at 
1–8. 
37 Shirley Gregor & Izak Benbasat, Explanations from Intelligent Systems: Theoretical 
Foundations and Implications for Practice, 23 MIS Q. 497, 503 (1999). 
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Buchanan and Shortliffe38 offer a similar example: 
 
RULE009 IF:  
1) The gram stain of the organism is gramneg, and 
2) The morphology of the organism is coccus 
THEN: There is strongly suggestive evidence (.8) that the 
identity of the organism is Neisseria 
  
As is typical in early A.I., questions we now recognise as hard such as 
“How do we decide inflation is high?” or “Why are these the 
preconditions of a tax cut?” are assumed to have been addressed by 
humans, and are not discussed as part of the explanation.39 As such, the 
explanations do not provide insight into what people in machine learning 
think of as the internal logic of black box classifiers. In fact, the first 
example can be rewritten as two diverse counterfactual statements: 
 
“If inflation was lower, a tax cut would not be 
recommended.” 
 
“If there was no trade deficit, a tax cut would not be 
recommended.” 
 
While the second example is closely related to the counterfactual:40 
 
“If the gram stain was negative or the morphology was 
not coccus, the algorithm would not be confident that the 
organism is Neisseria.” 
 
The most important difference between these approaches and 
counterfactuals is that counterfactuals continue functioning in an end-to-
end integrated approach. If the gram stain and morphology in the MYCIN 
example were also determined by the algorithm, counterfactuals would 
automatically return a close sample with a different classification, while 
these early methods could not be applied to such involved scenarios. 
                                               
38 BRUCE G. BUCHANAN & EDWARD D. SHORTLIFFE, RULE-BASED EXPERT SYSTEMS: 
THE MYCIN EXPERIMENTS OF THE STANFORD HEURISTIC PROGRAMMING PROJECT 344 
(1984). 
39 See, e.g., Gregor & Benbasat, supra note 37, at 503. 
40 However, they are not logically equivalent. The example from MYCIN differs in that 
it is still possible that some samples that are either gram positive or have a different 
morphology could still be classified as Neisseria. 
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As focus has switched from A.I. and logic-based systems towards 
machine learning tasks such as image recognition, the notion of an 
explanation has come to refer to providing insight into the internal state 
of an algorithm, or to human-understandable approximations of the 
algorithm.41 As such, the most related machine learning work to these, 
and to ours, is Martens and Provost.42 Uniquely among other works in 
machine learning, it shares our interest in making interventions to alter 
the outcome of classifier responses. However, the work is firmly linked 
to the problem of document classification, and the only interventions it 
proposes involve the removal of words from documents to stop websites 
from being classified as “adult.”43 The heuristic proposed cannot be easily 
generalised to either continuous variables,44 or even the addition of words 
to documents. 
The majority of works in machine learning on explanations and 
interpreting models concern themselves with generating simple models as 
local approximations of decisions.45 Generally, the idea is to create a 
simple human-understandable approximation of a decision-making 
algorithm that accurately models the decision given the current inputs, but 
may be arbitrarily bad for different inputs.46 However, there are numerous 
difficulties with treating these approaches as explanations suitable for a 
lay data subject. 
In general, it is unclear if these models are interpretable by non-
experts. They make a three-way trade-off between the quality of the 
approximation, the ease of understanding the function, and the size of the 
domain for which the approximation is valid.47 As we show in Appendix 
1, these local models can produce widely varying estimates of the 
importance of variables even in simple scenarios such as the single 
                                               
41 Ribeiro et al., supra note 14, at 1135–37. 
42 David Martens & Foster Provost, Explaining Data-Driven Document Classifications, 
38 MIS Q. 73, 73–74 (2013). 
43 Id. 
44 “Continuous variables” refers to variables whose assigned values are not restricted to 
a small set of discrete values: such as `present’ or `not present’, but instead can take any 
value in a given range.  Measurements such as height, weight, or how bright a particular 
pixel is in a photo, are often treated as continuous variables. See for example: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/maths/statistics/samplinghirev1.shtml  
45 Ribeiro et al., supra note 14, at 1135; Selvaraju et al., supra note 14, at 1–3; Simonyan 
et al., supra note 14, at 1. 
46 See Ribeiro et al., supra note 14, at 1143; Selvaraju et al., supra note 14, at 1–3; 
Simonyan et al., supra note 14, at 1. 
47 Bastani et al., supra note 13, at 1; Himabindu Lakkaraju et al., Interpretable & 
Explorable Approximations of Black Box Models, AʀXɪᴠ:1707.01154, at 1 (2013), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1707.01154.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JFE-N4YD]. 
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variable case, making it extremely difficult to reason about how a function 
varies as the inputs change. Moreover, the utility of such approaches 
outside of model debugging by expert programmers is unclear. Research 
has yet to be conducted on how to convey the various limitations and 
unreliabilities of these approaches to a lay audience in such a way that 
they can make use of such explanations. 
In contrast, counterfactual explanations are intentionally 
restricted. They are crafted in such a way as to provide a minimal amount 
of information capable of altering a decision, and they do not require the 
data subject to understand any of the internal logic of a model in order to 
make use of it. The downside to this is that individual counterfactuals may 
be overly restrictive. A single counterfactual may show how a decision is 
based on certain data that is both correct and unable to be altered by the 
data subject before future decisions, even if other data exist that could be 
amended for a favourable outcome. This problem could be resolved by 
offering multiple diverse counterfactual explanations to the data subject.  
C. ADVERSARIAL PERTURBATIONS AND COUNTERFACTUAL 
EXPLANATIONS 
The techniques used to generate counterfactual explanations on 
deep networks such as resnet48 are already widely studied in the machine 
learning literature under the name of “Adversarial Perturbations.”49 In 
these works, algorithms capable of computing counterfactuals are used to 
confuse existing classifiers by generating a synthetic data point close to 
an existing one such that the new synthetic data point is classified 
differently than the original one.50 
One strength of counterfactuals is that they can be efficiently and 
effectively computed by applying standard techniques, even to cutting-
edge architectures. Some of the largest and deepest neural networks are 
used in the field of computer vision, particularly in image labelling tasks 
                                               
48 See He et al., supra note 11, at 770. 
49 See Ian J. Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens & Christian Szegedy, Explaining and 
Harnessing Adversarial Examples, ARXIV:1412.6572 , at 1 (2014), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1412.6572.pdf [https://perma.cc/64BR-WVE7]; Seyed-Mohsen 
Moosavi-Dezfooli, Alhussein Fawzi & Pascal Frossard, Deepfool: A Simple and 
Accurate Method to Fool Deep Neural Networks, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE 
CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER VISION AND PATTERN RECOGNITION 2574–82 (2016); 
Christian Szegedy et al., Intriguing Properties of Neural Networks, ARXIV:1312.6199, 
at 2 (2013) , https://arxiv.org/pdf/1312.6199.pdf [https://perma.cc/K37R-6NP2]. 
50 See Goodfellow, Shlens & Szegedy, supra note 49, at 1; Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi & 
Frossard, supra note 49, at 2574–82; Szegedy et al., supra note 49, at 2. 
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such as ImageNet.51 These classifiers have been shown to be particularly 
vulnerable to a type of attack referred to as “Adversarial Perturbation” 
where small changes to a given image can result in the image being 
assigned to an entirely different class. For example, DeepFool52 defines 
an adverse perturbation of an image x, given a classifier, as the smallest 
change to x such that the classification changes. Essentially, this is a 
counterfactual by a different name. Finding a closest possible world to x 
such that the classification changes is, under the right choice of distance 
function, the same as finding the smallest change to x. 
Importantly, none of the standard works on Adversarial 
Perturbations make use of appropriate distance functions, and the majority 
of such approaches tend to favour making small changes to many 
variables, instead of providing sparse human interpretable solutions that 
modify only a few variables.53 Despite this, efficient computation of 
counterfactuals and Adversarial Perturbations is made possible by virtue 
of state-of-the-art algorithms being differentiable. Many optimisation 
techniques proposed in the Adversarial Perturbation literature are directly 
applicable to this problem, making counterfactual generation efficient.  
One of the more challenging aspects of Adversarial Perturbations 
is that these small perturbations of an image are barely human perceptible, 
but result in drastically different classifier responses.54 Informally, this 
appears to happen because the newly generated images do not lie in the 
“space of real-images,” but slightly outside it.55 This phenomenon serves 
as an important reminder that when computing counterfactuals by 
searching for a close possible world, it is at least as important that the 
solution found comes from a “possible world” as it is that it is close to the 
starting example. Further research into how data from high-dimensional 
and highly-structured spaces, such as natural images, can be characterised 
is needed before counterfactuals can be reliably used as explanations in 
these spaces. 
                                               
51 See Jia Deng et al., Imagenet: A Large-Scale Hierarchical Image Database, in IEEE 
CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER VISION AND PATTERN RECOGNITION 248–55 (2009). 
52 See Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi & Frossard, supra note 49, at 2574. 
53 See Jiawei Su, Danilo Vasconcellos Vargas & Sakurai Kouichi, One Pixel Attack for 
Fooling Deep Neural Networks,  ARXIV:1710.08864, at 8–9 (2017), 
http://arxiv.org/abs/1710.08864 [https://perma.cc/5F2N-JBJF]. 
54 Niki Kilbertus et al., Avoiding Discrimination through Causal Reasoning, 
ARXIV:1706,02744, at 1 (2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1706.02744.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8GZQ-PRSJ]. 
55 See generally Simant Dube, High Dimensional Spaces, Deep Learning and 
Adversarial Examples, ARXIV:1801.00634 (2018), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.00634.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8FE5-RY4X] (presenting preliminary investigation of this matter). 
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D. CAUSALITY AND FAIRNESS 
Several works have approached the problem of guaranteeing that 
algorithms are fair, i.e. that they do not exhibit a bias towards particular 
ethnic, gender, or other protected groups, using causal reasoning56 and 
counterfactuals.57 Kusner et al.58 consider counterfactuals where the 
subject belongs to a different race or sex, and require that the decision 
made remain the same under such a counterfactual for it to be considered 
fair. In contrast, we consider counterfactuals in which the decision differs 
from its current state. 
Many works have suggested that transparency might be a useful 
tool for enforcing fairness. While it is unclear how counterfactuals could 
be used for this purpose, it is also unclear if any form of explanation of 
individual decisions can in fact help. Grgic-Hlaca et al. 59 showed how 
understandable models can easily mislead our intuitions, and that 
predominantly using features people believed to be fair slightly increased 
the racism exhibited by algorithms, while decreasing accuracy. In general, 
the best tools for uncovering systematic biases are likely to be based upon 
large-scale statistical analysis and not upon explanations of individual 
decisions.60 
With that said, counterfactuals can provide evidence that an 
algorithmic decision is affected by a protected variable (e.g. race), and 
that it may therefore be discriminatory.61 For the types of distance 
function we consider in the next section, if the counterfactuals found 
change someone’s race, then the treatment of that individual is dependent 
on race. However, the converse statement is not true. Counterfactuals 
which do not modify a protected attribute cannot be used as evidence that 
the attribute was irrelevant to the decision. This is because counterfactuals 
describe only some of the dependencies between a particular decision and 
                                               
56 See Kilbertus et al., supra note 54, at 1. 
57 See Matt J. Kusner et al., Counterfactual Fairness, AʀXɪᴠ:1703.06856, at 16 (2017), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1703.06856.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SVN-7J9D]. 
58 Id. 
59 Nina Grgic-Hlaca et al., The Case for Process Fairness in Learning: Feature Selection 
for Fair Decision Making, in NIPS SYMPOSIUM ON MACHINE LEARNING AND THE LAW 
8 (2016). 
60 See Andrea Romei & Salvatore Ruggieri, A Multidisciplinary Survey on 
Discrimination Analysis, 29 KNOWLEDGE ENGINEERING REV. 582, 617 (2014). 
61 Establishing the influence of a protected variable on a decision does not, by itself, 
prove that illegal discrimination has occurred. Mitigating factors may exist which justify 
the usage of a protected attribute. See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big 
Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671, 676 (2016) (discussing disparate 
treatment in American anti-discrimination law). 
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specific external facts. This can be seen clearly in Section III.A, where 
the counterfactuals proposed for a particular classifier involve ‘black’ 
people changing their race, while not suggesting that ‘white’ people’s race 
should be varied. 
III. GENERATING COUNTERFACTUALS 
In the following section, we give examples of how meaningful 
counterfactuals can be easily computed. Many of the standard classifiers 
of machine learning (including Neural Networks, Support Vector 
Machines, and Regressors) are trained by finding the optimal set of 
weights w that minimises an objective over a set of training data. 
 
 
Equation 1 
 
Where yi is the label for data point xi and ρ(·) is a regularizer over the 
weights. We wish to find a counterfactual x' as close to the original point 
xi as possible such that fw(x') is equal to a new target y'. We can find x' by 
holding w fixed and minimizing the related objective. 
 
 
Equation 2 
 
Where d(·,·) is a distance function that measures how far the 
counterfactual x' and the original data point xi are from one another. In 
practice, maximisation over λ is done by iteratively solving for x' and 
increasing λ until a sufficiently close solution is found. 
The choice of optimiser for these problems is relatively 
unimportant. In practice, any optimiser capable of training the classifier 
under Equation 1 seems to work equally well, and we use ADAM62 for all 
experiments. As local minima are a concern, we initialise each run with 
different random values for x' and select as our counterfactual the best 
minimizer of Equation 2. These different minima can be used as a diverse 
set of multiple counterfactuals. 
                                               
62 Diederik Kingma & Jimmy Ba, ADAM: A Method for Stochastic Optimization, 
ARXIV:1412.6980, at 1–4 (2014), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1412.6980.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3RH4-WSXG]. 
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Of particular importance is the choice of distance function used to 
decide which synthetic data point x' is closest to the original data point xi. 
As a sensible first choice, which should be refined based on subject- and 
task-specific requirements, we suggest use of the L1 norm, or Manhattan 
distance, weighted by the inverse median absolute deviation. This is 
written as MADk for the median absolute deviation of feature k, over the 
set of points P: 
 
 
Equation 3 
 
We chose d(·,·) as: 
 
 
Equation 4 
 
This distance metric has several desirable properties. Firstly, it captures 
some of the intrinsic volatility of the space, which means that if a feature 
k varies wildly across the dataset, a synthetic point x' may also vary this 
feature while remaining close to xi under the distance metric. The use of 
median absolute difference rather than the more usual standard deviation 
also makes this metric more robust to outliers. Of equal importance are 
the sparsity-inducing properties of the L1 norm. The L1 norm is widely 
recognised in mathematical and machine learning circles for its tendency 
to induce sparse solutions in which most entries are zero when paired with 
an appropriate cost function.63  
When computing human-understandable counterfactuals, this 
property is highly desirable as it corresponds to counterfactuals in which 
only a small number of variables are changed and most remain constant, 
making the counterfactuals much easier to communicate and comprehend. 
This metric works equally well on the examples we consider.  
To demonstrate the importance of the choice of distance function, 
we illustrate below the impact of varying d(·,·) on the LSAT dataset. A 
further challenge lies in ensuring that the synthetic counterfactual x' 
corresponds to a valid data point. We illustrate some of the pitfalls and 
                                               
63 See, e.g., Emmanuel J. Candes, Justin K. Romberg & Terence Tao, Stable Signal 
Recovery from Incomplete and Inaccurate Measurements, 59 COMM. PURE & APPLIED 
MATHEMATICS 1207, 1212 (2006). 
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remedies for dealing with discrete features when computing 
counterfactuals. 
A. LSAT DATASET 
We first consider the generation of counterfactuals on the LSAT64 dataset. 
In particular, we consider a stripped-down version used in the fairness 
literature65 that attempts to predict students’ first-year average grade on 
the basis of their race, grade-point average prior to law school, and law 
school entrance exam scores. This stripped-down version of the LSAT 
dataset is used in the fairness literature, as classifiers trained on this data 
naturally exhibit bias against ‘black’ people.66 As a result, we will find 
evidence of this bias in our neural network in some of the counterfactuals 
we generate. 
We generate a three-layer fully-connected neural-network, with 
two hidden layers of 20 neurons each feeding into a final classifier. Even 
a small model like this has 941 different weights controlling its behaviour 
and 40 neurons that exhibit complex interdependencies, which makes 
conveying its internal state challenging.   
Choosing d as the unweighted squared Euclidean distance 
 
Equation 5 
we consider the Counterfactual, “What would have to be changed to give 
a predicted score of 0?”67 Directly solving for Eq. 2 gives the results in 
the central block labelled “Counterfactuals” in Table 1.  
  
 
Table 1 - Unnormalized L2 
                                               
64 See R. Darrell Bock & Marcus Lieberman, Fitting a Response Model for n 
Dichotomously Scored Items, 35 PSYCHOMETRIKA 179, 187–96 (1970). 
65 See, e.g., Chris Russell et al., When Worlds Collide: Integrating Different 
Counterfactual Assumptions in Fairness, in ADVANCES IN NEURAL INFORMATION 
PROCESSING SYSTEMS 6396–6405 (2017); Kusner et al., supra note 57, at 9–12 
66 See Russell et al., supra note 65, at 6396–6405; Kusner et al., supra note 57, at 10. 
67 The scores being predicted are normalised, with 0 corresponding to the average score. 
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Two artefacts are immediately apparent. The first is that although in this 
dataset, race is modelled using a discrete variable that can only take the 
labels 0 or 1, corresponding to ‘white’ or ‘black’ respectively, a variety 
of meaningless values, either fractional or negative, have been assigned 
to it. In the literature on adversarial perturbation, generally values are 
capped to lie within a sensible range such as [0,1] to stop some of these 
artefacts from occurring. However, this would still allow the fractional 
solutions shown in the bottom two examples. Instead, we clamp the race 
variable forcing it to take either value 0 or 1 in two separate run-throughs, 
and then take as a solution the closest counterfactual found in either of the 
runs. These results can be seen in the rightmost column “Counterfactual 
Hybrid.” The algorithm now suggests always changing the race to ‘white’ 
as part of the counterfactual. Of particular note is that the counterfactuals 
show that ‘black’ students would get better scores.  
The second artefact is that the algorithm much prefers 
significantly varying the GPA than the exam results, and this is down to 
our choice of distance function. We took as d(·,·), the squared Euclidean 
distance, and this generally prefers changes that are as small as possible 
and spread uniformly across all variables. However, the range of the GPA 
is much smaller than that of the exam scores. Adjusting for this by 
normalising each component by its standard deviation, i.e.  
 
Equation 6 
gives the set of counterfactuals shown in Table 2.  
 
 
Table 2 - Normalised L2 
After normalisation, the GPA remains much more consistent, and 
naturally remains within an expected range of values. Note that for ‘black’ 
students, race does vary under the computed counterfactual, revealing a 
dependence between the decision and race (which is often a legally 
protected attribute).  
Finally, we show the use of the L1 norm weighted by the inverse 
median absolute deviation (Table 3). This returns similar but sparser 
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results to the weighted squared Euclidean distance, with the GPA not 
being changed under the counterfactuals. 
 
Table 3 - Normalised L1 
These final Normalised L1 Hybrid Counterfactuals can be expressed in a 
more accessible text form that only describes the alterations to the 
original data: 
Person 1: If your LSAT was 34.0, you would have an 
average predicted score (0). 
Person 2: If your LSAT was 32.4, you would have an 
average predicted score (0). 
Person 3: If your LSAT was 33.5, and you were ‘white’, 
you would have an average predicted score (0). 
Person 4: If your LSAT was 35.8, and you were ‘white’, 
you would have an average predicted score (0). 
Person 5: If your LSAT was 34.9, you would have an 
average predicted score (0). 
B. PIMA DIABETES DATABASE 
To demonstrate Counterfactuals on a more complex problem, we consider 
a database used to predict whether women of Pima heritage are at risk of 
diabetes.68 We generate a classifier that returns a risk score between [0, 
1] by training a similar three-layer fully-connected neural-network with 
two hidden layers of 20 neurons to perform logistic regression. This 
classifier takes as input 8 different variables of varying predictive power, 
including number of pregnancies, age and BMI. Counterfactuals are 
generated to answer the question “What would have to be different for 
this individual to have a risk score of 0.5?” To induce sparsity in the 
answer and generate counterfactuals that are easy for a human to evaluate, 
with only a small number of changed variables, we make use of the L1 
norm, or Manhattan distance, weighted by the inverse median absolute 
                                               
68 Jack W. Smith et al., Using the ADAP Learning Algorithm to Forecast the Onset of 
Diabetes Mellitus, PROC. ANN. SYMP. ON COMPUT. APPLICATION MED. CARE 261, 261–
62 (1988). 
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deviation, instead of the Euclidean distance. We also cap variables to 
prevent them from going outside the range seen in the training data. 
With this done, the counterfactuals typically vary from the original 
data only in a small number of variables, and these differences are 
automatically rendered in human readable text form. 
 
Person 1: If your 2-Hour serum insulin level was 154.3, 
you would have a score of 0.51. 
Person 2: If your 2-Hour serum insulin level was 169.5, 
you would have a score of 0.51. 
Person 3: If your Plasma glucose concentration was 158.3 
and your 2-Hour serum insulin level was 160.5, you would 
have a score of 0.51. 
 
These counterfactuals are similar to the risk factors already used by 
doctors to communicate, e.g. “If your body mass index is greater than 40 
you are morbidly obese, and at greater risk of ill-health.” However, 
counterfactuals may make use of multiple factors and convey a 
personalised risk model that takes into account other attributes that may 
mitigate or increase risk. 
C. CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS AND COUNTERFACTUAL 
EXPLANATIONS 
The reader familiar with causal modelling may have noticed that our 
counterfactual explanations are not making use of causal models or 
equivalently, that they make naive assumptions that variables are 
independent of one another. There are several reasons for this. One 
important use of counterfactual explanations is to provide the data subject 
with information to make a guided audit of the data and check for relevant 
inaccuracies in the data. Treating such errors as independent and drawn 
from a robust distribution such as the Laplacian (corresponding to use of 
the L1 norm in our objective) is a sensible model for these errors. More 
importantly, creating and interpreting accurate causal models is difficult. 
Requiring data controllers to build and convey to a lay audience a causal 
model that accurately captures the interdependencies between 
measurements such as the number of pregnancies, age, and BMI is 
extremely challenging and may be irrelevant.  
Counterfactuals generated from an accurate causal model may 
ultimately be of use to experts (e.g., to medical professionals trying to 
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decide which intervention will move a patient out of an at-risk group). 
However, the purpose of our paper is to illustrate how far you can go with 
minimal assumptions and that such detailed causal models are 
unnecessary for counterfactual explanations to be of use. 
IV. ADVANTAGES OF COUNTERFACTUAL EXPLANATIONS 
Counterfactual explanations differ markedly from existing proposals in 
the machine learning and legal communities (particularly regarding the 
GDPR’s “right to explanation”),69 while offering several advantages. 
Principally, counterfactuals bypass the substantial challenge of explaining 
the internal workings of complex machine learning systems.70 Even if 
technically feasible, such explanations may be of little practical value to 
data subjects. In contrast, counterfactuals provide information to the data 
subject that is both easily digestible and practically useful for 
understanding the reasons for a decision, challenging them, and altering 
future behaviour for a better result.  
The reduced regulatory burden of counterfactual explanations is 
also significant. Current state-of-the-art machine learning methods make 
decisions based upon deep networks that compose together functions 
more than a thousand times and with more than ten million parameters 
controlling their behaviour.71 As the working memory of humans can 
contain around seven distinct items,72 it remains unclear whether “human-
comprehensible meaningful information” about the logic involved in a 
particular decision can ever exist, disregarding whether such information 
could be meaningfully conveyed to non-experts.73 As such, regulations 
that require meaningful information regarding the internal logic to be 
                                               
69 Although a right to explanation is not itself legally binding, data subjects are entitled 
to receive “meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance 
and the envisaged consequences” of automated decision-making under the GDPR's Art. 
13–15. Wachter, Mittelstadt & Floridi, supra note 1, at 16. Others have proposed that 
these provisions require the data subject to be given information about the internal logic 
and the rationale of specific decisions. The information sought aligns with the type of 
explanation pursued in the machine learning community. For an explanation of why such 
information is not legally required, and why Art. 13–15 do not constitute a de facto right 
to explanation, see Wachter, Mittelstadt & Floridi, supra note 1, at 10–11, 14–19. 
70 Burrell, supra note 5, at 9. 
71 See generally Kaiming He et al., Deep Residual Learning for Image Recognition, 
PROC. IEEE CONF. ON COMPUT. VISION & PATTERN RECOGNITION 770, 770–78 (2016); 
Gao Huang et al., Deep Networks with Stochastic Depth, EUROPEAN CONF. ON COMPUT. 
VISION 646, 646–61 (2016). 
72 George A. Miller, The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on 
Our Capacity for Processing Information, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 81, 91 (1956). 
73 Burrell, supra note 5, at 9. 
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conveyable to a lay audience could prohibit the use of many standard 
approaches. In contrast, counterfactual explanations do not attempt to 
convey the logic involved and, as shown in the previous section, are 
simple to compute and convey.  
Such expectations of providing information regarding the internal 
logic of algorithmic decision-making systems have surfaced recently in 
relation to the GDPR and in particular, the “right to explanation.” The 
GDPR contains numerous provisions requiring information to be 
communicated to individuals about automated decision-making.74 
Significant discussion has emerged in legal and machine learning 
communities regarding the specific requirements and limitations of the 
GDPR in this regard and in particular, how to provide information about 
decisions made by highly complex automated systems.75 As 
counterfactuals provide a method to explain some of the rationale of an 
automated decision while avoiding the major pitfalls of interpretability or 
opening the “black box,” they may prove a highly useful mechanism to 
meet the explicit requirements and background aims of the GDPR. 
V. COUNTERFACTUAL EXPLANATIONS AND THE GDPR 
Although the GDPR’s “right to explanation” is not legally binding, it has 
nonetheless connected discussion of data protection law to the 
longstanding question of how algorithmic decisions can be explained to 
experts as well as non-expert parties affected by the decision.76 Answering 
this question largely depends upon the intended purpose of the 
explanation; the information to be provided must be tailored in terms of 
structure, complexity, and content with a particular aim in mind. 
Unfortunately, the GDPR does not explicitly define requirements for 
explanations of automated decision-making and provides few hints as to 
the intended purpose of explanations of automated decision-making.77 
Recital 71 of the GDPR, a non-binding provision and the only place where 
                                               
74 Regulation 2016/679 of Apr. 27, 2016, on the Protection of Natural Persons with 
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and 
Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [hereinafter 
GDPR], GDPR, recitals 63 & 71 & arts. 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g), 15(1)(h) & 22, 2016 O.J. (L 
119) 12, 14, 41, 42, 43, 46 (EU). 
75 See generally Wachter, Mittelstadt & Floridi, supra note 1; Mendoza & Bygrave, 
supra note 1; Edwards & Veale, supra note 1; Malgieri & Comandé, supra note 1; Selbst 
& Powles, supra note 1; Doshi-Velez et al., supra note 15; Christopher Kuner et al., 
Machine Learning with Personal Data: Is Data Protection Law Smart Enough to Meet 
the Challenge?, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 1 (2017). 
76 See Wachter, Mittelstadt & Floridi, supra note 1, at 3–4. 
77 See id. at 42. 
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the word explanation is mentioned, states that suitable safeguards against 
automated decision-making should be implemented and “should include 
specific information to the data subject and the right to obtain human 
intervention, to express his or her point of view, to obtain an explanation 
of the decision reached after such assessment and to challenge the 
decision.”78  
This is the only time where an explanation is mentioned in the 
GDPR, leaving the reader with little insight into what type of explanation 
is intended or what purpose it should serve. Based on the text, the only 
clear indication is that legislators wanted to clarify that some type of 
explanation can voluntarily be offered after a decision has been made. 
This can be seen as Recital 71 separates “specific information” which 
should be given before a decision is made,79 from safeguards that apply 
after a decision has been made80 (“an explanation of the decision reached 
after such assessment” (emphasis added)).81 Further indications are not 
provided of the intended content of such ex post explanations.82 
 The content of an explanation must reflect its intended purpose. 
Given the lack of guidance in the GDPR, many aims for explanations are 
feasible. Reflecting the GDPR’s emphasis on protections and rights for 
individuals,83 here we examine potential purposes for explanations from 
the perspective of the data subject. We propose three possible aims of 
                                               
78 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, recital 71, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 14 (EU). 
79 Jörg Hladjk, DS-GVO Art. 22 Automatisierte Entscheidungen im Einzelfall 
einschließlich Profiling, in DATENSCHUTZ-GRUNDVERORDNUNG 529, 535 (Eugen 
Ehmann & Martin Selmayr eds., 1st ed. 2017). 
80 The European Parliament makes the same distinction (information obligations vs. 
explanations of automated decisions) in their draft report on civil law rules on robotics 
when referring to the GDPR. See European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs, 
Draft Report with Recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics 
(Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML%2BCOMPARL%2BPE-
582.443%2B01%2BDOC%2BPDF%2BV0//EN [https://perma.cc/A2L8-FKMP]; 
Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Luciano Floridi, Transparent, Explainable, and 
Accountable AI for Robotics, 2 SCI. ROBOTICS 1, 1 (2017); Hladjk, supra note 79 at 535–
36 (supporting this view that an explanation should be given after a decision has been 
taken, while recognising that this is not legally binding). 
81 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, recital 71, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 14 (EU). 
82 See generally European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and On the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data 
Protection Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012), 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6QSX-F4JX]. 
83 Christopher Kuner, The European Commission’s Proposed Data Protection 
Regulation: A Copernican Revolution in European Data Protection Law, PRIVACY & 
SEC. L. REP. 1, 6–7, 8 (2012). 
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explanations of automated decisions: to enhance understanding of the 
scope of automated decision-making and the reasons for a particular 
decision, to help contest a decision, and to alter future behaviour to 
potentially receive a preferred outcome. This is not an exhaustive list of 
potential aims of explanations, but rather reflects how the recipient of an 
automated decision, as with any type of decision, may wish to understand 
its scope, effects, and rationale and take actions in response. In the 
following sections, we assess how these three purposes are reflected in 
the GDPR and the extent to which counterfactual explanations meet and 
exceed the GDPR’s requirements.  
A. EXPLANATIONS TO UNDERSTAND DECISIONS 
One potential purpose of explanations is to provide the data subject with 
understanding of the scope of automated decision-making, and the 
reasons that led to a particular decision. Several provisions in the GDPR 
can support a data subject’s understanding of automated decision-
making, although the types of information that must be shared tend to 
enhance a broad understanding of automated decision-making systems, 
as opposed to the rationale of specific decisions.84 As a result, the GDPR 
does not appear to require opening the “black box” to explain the 
internal logic of the decision-making system to data subjects. With this 
in mind, counterfactuals can provide information aligned with the 
GDPR’s various informational requirements, while also providing some 
insight into the reasons that led to a particular decision. Counterfactuals, 
thus, could meet and exceed the requirements of the GDPR. 
The description of explanations in Recital 71 does not include a 
requirement to open the “black box.”85 Understanding the internal logic 
                                               
84 See Wachter, Mittelstadt & Floridi, supra note 1, at 5. 
85 Id.; see also ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, GUIDELINES ON 
AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING AND PROFILING FOR THE PURPOSES OF 
REGULATION 2016/679 29 (2018), 
http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/document.cfm?doc_id=49826.  The Guidelines, 
which are very ambiguous, seem to support the claim that such a requirement is not only 
absent, but also might not have been intended. On the one hand transparency in how 
decisions are made (Recital 71) appears to be very important. See Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, Guidelines at 27. However, at the same time, the guidelines 
state that the aim of Art. 15(1)(h) is not to create individual explanations that require 
understanding the internal logic of the algorithm. Id. at 27. Hence, the guidelines suggest 
that Art. 15(1)(h) calls for information about general system functionality, as is the case 
with its counterparts in Art. 13(2)(f) and Art. 14(2)(g). This reading of Articles 13–15 
would suggest that the Article 29 Working Party does not view non-binding Recital 71 
as a requirement to explain the internal logic of individual decisions, as even the legally 
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of the algorithmic decision-making system is not explicitly required. 
Elsewhere, the GDPR contains transparency mechanisms,86 notification 
duties,87  and the right of access,88  all of which create informational 
requirements concerning automated decision-making. Art. 13–15 
describe what kind of information needs to be provided if data are 
collected, either immediately when collected from the data subject,89  the 
latest after a month when collected from a third party,90 or at any time if 
requested from the data subject.91 Among other things, Art. 12 explains 
how this information (as defined in Art. 13–14) should be conveyed.92  
Art. 12–14 suggest that data subjects must be provided with “a meaningful 
overview of the intended processing,”93 including “the existence of 
automated decision-making, including profiling, referred to in Art. 22(1) 
and (4) and, at least in those cases, meaningful information about the logic 
involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of 
such processing for the data subject,”94 as opposed to a detailed 
explanation of the internal logic of a system after a decision has been 
made.95 Rather they aim to offer a generic overview of intended 
processing activities, which enhances the data subject’s understanding of 
the scope and purpose of automated decision-making.96  
                                               
binding text in Article 15(1)(h), which is sufficiently vague to allow such an 
interpretation, see  Wachter, Mittelstadt & Floridi, supra note 1, is not thought to create 
such a requirement. For further support that Recital 71 does not hinge on opening the 
black box, see Martini, DS-GVO Art. 22 Automatisierte Entscheidungen im Einzelfall 
einschließlich Profiling, in DATENSCHUTZ-GRUNDVERORDNUNG Rn 35-37 (Paal & 
Pauly eds., 1st ed. 2017). 
86 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 12, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 39–40 (EU). 
87 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, arts. 13 & 14, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 40–42 (EU). 
88 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 15, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43 (EU). 
89 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 13–15, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 40–43 (EU). 
90 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 14, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 41–42 (EU).  
91 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 15, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43 (EU). 
92 Dirk Heckmann & Anne Paschke, DS-GVO Art. 12 Transparente Information, 
Kommunikation, in DATENSCHUTZ-GRUNDVERORDNUNG 367, 370 (Eugen Ehmann & 
Martin Selmayr eds., 1st ed. 2017). 
93 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 12(7), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 40 (EU). 
94 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, arts. 13(2)(f) & 14(2)(g), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 41, 42 (EU). 
95 Lorenz Franck, DS-GVO Art. 12 Transparente Information, Kommunikation, in 
DATENSCHUTZ-GRUNDVERORDNUNG VO (EU) 2016/679 316, 320 (Peter Gola ed., 1st 
ed. 2017); Sebastian Schulz, DS-GVO Art. 22 Automatisierte Entscheidungen im 
Einzelfall, in DATENSCHUTZ-GRUNDVERORDNUNG VO (EU) 2016/679 410, 418–19 
(Peter Gola ed., 1st ed. 2017); Suzanne Rodway, Just How Fair Will Processing Notices 
Need to Be Under the GDPR, 16 PRIV. & DATA PROT. 16, 16–17 (2016). 
96 See Kuner, supra note 75, at 2; ROSEMARY JAY, GUIDE TO THE GENERAL DATA 
PROTECTION REGULATION: A COMPANION TO DATA PROTECTION LAW AND PRACTICE 
226 (4th Revised ed. 2017). 
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Art. 12(7) clarifies that the aim of Art. 13-14 is to provide “in an 
easily visible, intelligible and clearly legible manner, a meaningful 
overview of the intended processing.”97 Two requirements are notable: (1) 
that the information provided must be meaningful to its recipient and 
broad in scope (a “meaningful overview”), and (2) that the notification 
occurs prior to processing (“intended processing”). 
To understand what would constitute a meaningful overview, the 
envisioned medium of disclosure is instructive. Broadly applicable 
information appears to be required, rather than personalised disclosures. 
Legal scholars have suggested that notification duties can be satisfied via 
updates to existing privacy statements or notices98 (e.g. those displayed 
on websites or using QR codes).99 This requirement does not change 
based on the form of data collection.100 When data are collected from a 
third party,101 an email sent to the data subject linking to the data 
controller’s privacy statement(s) could suffice.102 The same holds true for 
personalised links103 referring to the privacy notice. Tools similar to those 
currently used to make users aware of the usage of cookies or monitoring 
shopping behaviour can be envisioned to satisfy the requirements in Art. 
14, thus making data subjects immediately aware of data collection.104 
Detailed information appears to not be necessary as Art. 12(7) states that 
the required information can be provided along with standardised icons.105 
In trilogue, the European Parliament proposed several standardised icons 
that were ultimately not adopted (see Appendix 2). Despite this, the 
proposed icons reveal the initial expectations of regulators for simple, 
easily understood information.106  
                                               
97 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 12(7), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 40 (EU) (emphasis added). 
98 See, e.g., ALAIN BENSOUSSAN, GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION: TEXTS, 
COMMENTARIES AND PRACTICAL GUIDELINES 113 (1st ed. 2017); Franck, supra note 95, 
at 320; JAY, supra note 96 at 223; Heckmann & Paschke, supra note 92, at 375–76; 
Rainer Knyrim, DS-GVO Art. 14 Informationspflicht bei Erhebung von Daten, in 
DATENSCHUTZ-GRUNDVERORDNUNG 412, 417–18 (Eugen Ehmann & Martin Selmayr 
eds., 1st ed. 2017). 
99 Lorenz Franck, DS-GVO Art. 13 Informationspflicht bei Erhebung von Daten, in 
DATENSCHUTZ-GRUNDVERORDNUNG VO (EU) 2016/679 331, 338–39 (Peter Gola ed., 
1st ed. 2017). 
100 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 85, at 25-6. 
101 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 14, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 41 (EU). 
102 Knyrim, supra note 98, at 415–19. 
103 Franck, supra note 95, at 322–23. 
104 Knyrim, supra note 98, at 420. 
105 Id. at 417; ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, GUIDELINES ON 
TRANSPARENCY UNDER REGULATION 2016/679 (2017). 
106 The European Commission is tasked in Art. 12(8) to develop such icons.  
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These examples suggest Art. 13–14 aim to provide a general 
overview of data processing that will be meaningful to all data subjects 
involved (e.g., all users of Twitter). The captive audience is more likely 
to be the general public or user base, not individual users, and their unique 
circumstances.107 This format of disclosure suggests notifications should 
be comprehensible to a general audience with mixed expertise and 
background knowledge. An “uneducated layperson” may be the 
envisioned audience for disclosures.108 This coincides with the general 
notion of Art. 12(1) that all information and communication with the data 
subject has to be in a “concise, transparent, intelligible and easily 
accessible form,” suggesting in-depth technical information and 
‘legalese’ would be inappropriate.109 At a minimum, each provision 
suggests that information disclosures need to be tailored to their audience, 
with envisioned audiences including children and uneducated laypeople. 
Notifications regarding automated decision-making110 face 
particular constraints within an overall “meaningful overview.” 
According to the Article 29 Working Party,111 the UK Information 
Commissioner’s Office,112 and other commentators,113 informing the data 
subject about the “significance and envisaged consequences of automated 
decision-making” in a very simple manner, including “how profiling 
might affect the data subject generally, rather than information about a 
specific decision” will be sufficient.114 For instance, an explanation of 
                                               
107 See Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, recital 58, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 11 (EU); Heckmann 
& Paschke, supra note 92, at 378. Note that this information can also be provided orally. 
See JAY, supra note 96, at 216–17 (noting this also but warning that data controllers 
carry the burden to prove that the information was communicated).  
108 Franck, supra note 95, at 322 (noting this for the elderly, uneducated people, 
foreigners, or children); see also Heckmann & Paschke, supra note 92, at 376–77. 
109 JAY, supra note 96, at 218; Heckmann & Paschke, supra note 92, at 376; Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party, supra note 85, at 25-6. 
110 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 13(2), 14(2)(g), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 41–42 (EU). 
111 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 85. 
112 Info. Comm’r Office, Feedback Request - Profiling and Automated Decision-making 
15–16 (2017), https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/consultations/2013894/ico-
feedback-request-profiling-and-automated-decision-making.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PC33-PUS8] Note the UK’s ICO is preparing new guidelines in the 
form of a living document, which will be continuously updated. See: UK’s Information 
Commissioner’s Office, RIGHTS RELATED TO AUTOMATED DECISION MAKING INCLUDING 
PROFILING (2018), https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-the-general-data-
protection-regulation-gdpr/individual-rights/rights-related-to-automated-decision-
making-including-profiling/ (last visited Mar 18, 2018). 
113 See, e.g., Rodway, supra note 95; Paal, DS-GVO Art. 13 Informationspflicht bei 
Erhebung von personenbezogenen Daten bei der betroffenen Person, in DATENSCHUTZ-
GRUNDVERORDNUNG (Paal & Pauly eds., 1st ed. 2017). 
114 Info. Comm’r Office, supra note 112, at 16. 
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how a low rating of creditworthiness can affect payment options,115 how 
intended data processing may result in a credit or job application being 
declined,116 or how driving behaviour might impact insurance premiums 
would be sufficient.117 Similarly, “meaningful information about the logic 
involved” is said to require only “clarifying: of the categories of data used 
to create a profile; the source of the data; and why this data is considered 
relevant”118 as opposed to a “detailed technical description about how an 
algorithm or machine learning works.”119  
This view is echoed in the Article 29 Working Party’s guidelines 
on automated individual decision-making. First the “right to explanation” 
is only mentioned once in the guidelines without any further details on 
scope or purpose. This “right” is clearly separated from the legally 
binding safeguards in Art. 22(3), implying that the Article 29 Working 
Party sees a difference in the legal standing of Recitals and legally binding 
provisions.120 In fact, the guidelines does not even list the right to 
explanation in their “good practice suggestions” section.121 Transparency 
about the fact that data controllers “are engaging in this type of activity,” 
referring to automated decision-making, is essential and the main goal of 
Art. 13 and 14. The aim of these articles is thus to provide ex ante 
information.122 This is also evident in the fact that the guidelines states 
that the phrase ‘significance’ and ‘envisaged consequences’ means “that 
information must be provided about intended or future processing, and 
how the automated decision-making might affect the data subject.”123 
Elsewhere, the guidelines state that “details of the main characteristics 
considered in reaching the decision, the source of this information and the 
                                               
115 Paal, supra note 113 at Rn. 31-32; Info. Comm’r Office, supra note 112, at 16. 
116 Rodway, supra note 95, at 2. 
117 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 85, at 26. 
118 Info. Comm’r Office, supra note 112, at 15. 
119 Id. See also Eugen Ehmann, DS-GVO Art. 15 Auskunftsrecht der betroffenen Person, 
in DATENSCHUTZ-GRUNDVERORDNUNG, 430–31 (Eugen Ehmann & Martin Selmayr 
eds., 1st ed. 2017) (arguing that Art. 15 only entitles the data subject to know about the 
abstract logic and principles of data processing, but not the formula or code). Reference 
is made to Recital 63 in the English and French versions of the GDPR to support this 
claim. See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 85, at 25 (“The 
controller should find simple ways to tell the data subject about the rationale behind, or 
the criteria relied on in reaching the decision without necessarily always attempting a 
complex explanation of the algorithms used or disclosure of the full algorithm.”). 
120 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, supra note 88 at 27. 
121 Id. at 32. 
122 Id. at 25. 
123 Id. at 26. Further the guidelines state that data controllers can voluntary “to explain 
how a past decision has been made” which indicates the this is the exception to the rule.  
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relevance” should be provided under Art 13–14.124 Further, the 
“controller should find simple ways to tell the data subject about the 
rationale behind, or the criteria relied on in reaching the decision. The 
GDPR requires the controller to provide meaningful information about 
the logic involved, not necessarily a complex explanation of the 
algorithms used or disclosure of the full algorithm.”125  
However, it must be noted that this requirement, despite referring 
to the decision-making rationale, seems to refer to general system 
functionality rather than an explanation of an individual decision.126 The 
guidelines state that Art 15(1)(h), which is seen to provide identical 
information as Art 13(2)(f) and 14(2)(g),127 requires the data controller to 
“provide the data subject with information about the envisaged 
consequences of the processing, rather than an explanation of a particular 
decision.”128 The is further supported as the guidelines state that 
“meaningful information about the logic involved“ means that “Instead of 
providing a complex mathematical explanation about how algorithms or 
machine-learning work, the controller should consider using clear and 
comprehensive ways to deliver the information to the data subject, for 
example: the categories of data that have been or will be used in the 
profiling or decision-making process; why these categories are considered 
pertinent; how any profile used in the automated decision-making process 
is built, including any statistics used in the analysis; why this profile is 
relevant to the automated decision-making process; and how it is used for 
a decision concerning the data subject.”129  
Overall, according to the Article 29 Working Party, the aim of 
Articles 13-15 is to demonstrate how automated processes help data 
controllers to make more accurate, unbiased, and responsible decisions 
and illustrate how the data, characteristics, and method used are suitable 
to achieve this goal.130 In other words, the process of decision-making and 
the algorithm itself do not need to be fully disclosed, but rather a 
                                               
124 Id. at 26. 
125 Id. at 25. 
126 For an in-depth analysis between systems functionality and rationale of a decision see 
Wachter, Mittelstadt & Floridi, supra note 1. 
127 See ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, supra note 88 at 26. 
128 Id. at 27. “The controller should provide the data subject with general information 
(notably, on factors taken into account for the decision-making process, and on their 
respective ‘weight’ on an aggregate level) which is also useful for him or her to challenge 
the decision” is given as an example showing that only information about system 
functionality will be required. 
129 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, supra note 88 at 31. 
130 See id. at 26. 
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description of the logic of the algorithm which may include a list of data 
sources or variables.131 This position finds further support in the Working 
Party’s guidelines on transparency,132 which state that the notification 
duties in Art. 13-14 can be satisfied via standardised privacy notices, 
visualisation tools, and icons.  
Each disclosure under Art. 13–14 must occur prior to data 
processing133 or at the time of data collection, but before automated 
decision-making starts.134 Evidence of this is seen in the future-oriented 
language used in Art. 13(2)(f) and Art. 14(2)(g),135 the obligation for 
information about the necessity of providing data for processing,136 the 
clarification in Art. 12(7) that information must be provided about 
“intended processing,” the Article 29 Working Party’s guidelines on 
transparency,137 and other provisions and jurisprudence.138 For automated 
                                               
131 Paal, supra note 113, at Rn. 31-32 (seeing no difference between Art 13-15 in terms 
what kind of information needs to be provided). See also Paal, DS-GVO Art. 15 
Auskunftsrecht der betroffenen Person, in DATENSCHUTZ-GRUNDVERORDNUNG, Rn. 31 
(Paal & Pauly eds., 1st ed. 2017). Further support is offered by the text of Recital 51 
proposed by the European Parliament during Trilogue, which referred to “the general 
logic of the data that are undergoing the processing and what might be the consequences 
of such processing.” European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs, Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation) 
A7-0402/2013, 21 (Nov. 21, 2013), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2013-
0402&language=EN [https://perma.cc/27B4-5PWC]. 
132 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, supra note 108. 
 133 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 12(7), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 40 (EU). 
134 See Wachter, Mittelstadt & Floridi, supra note 1, at 15; see also Franck, supra note 
99; Knyrim, supra note 98; JAY, supra note 95, at 225 (arguing that the notification 
duties in Art. 13 need to apply before the data is collected); Franck, supra note 95 at 328 
(linking this to Art. 13(2)(e) that obligates the data controllers to state “whether the 
provision of personal data is a statutory or contractual requirement, or a requirement 
necessary to enter into a contract, as well as whether the data subject is obliged to provide 
the personal data and of the possible consequences of failure to provide such data.”). 
Information about the necessity to provide data must therefore be given before the data 
is collected. See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 85, at 12-3. 
135 See Wachter, Mittelstadt & Floridi, supra note 1, at 15; Frederike Kaltheuner & 
Elettra Bietti, Data is power: Towards additional guidance on profiling and automated 
decision-making in the GDPR, 2 J. INF. RIGHTS POLICY PRACT. (2018), 
https://journals.winchesteruniversitypress.org/index.php/jirpp/article/view/45 (last 
visited Mar 18, 2018).  
136 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 13(2)(e), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 41 (EU). 
137 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, supra note 108 at 14 state that 
“Articles 13 and 14 set out information which must be provided to the data subject at the 
commencement phase of the processing cycle.” 
138 See Rainer Knyrim, DS-GVO Art. 13 Informationspflicht bei Erhebung von Daten, in 
DATENSCHUTZ-GRUNDVERORDNUNG 391, 411–12 (Eugen Ehmann & Martin Selmayr 
eds., 1st ed. 2017); Knyrim, supra note 98, at 418–19 (noting that prior notification is 
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decision-making, it is essential that information is provided before the 
start, else the right not to be subject of an automated decision can never 
be realised. The data subject has no chance to assess the associated 
risks,139 or whether one of the grounds in Art. 22(2) actually apply that 
allow automated decision-making. Under Art. 22(2), automated decision-
making is only lawful if it “is necessary for entering into, or performance 
of, a contract between the data subject and a data controller,”140 if it is 
authorised by Member State law,141 or if the data subject has given 
explicit consent.142 If notifications do not occur prior to processing or 
decision-making, data subjects would only be able to contest decisions 
after the fact. This can be time and cost intensive, and unable to repair 
financial or reputational damage. Hence, one purpose of Art. 13–14 is to 
make the data subject aware of future processing143 and to allow them to 
decide if they want their data to be processed (e.g., consent),144 assess the 
legitimacy (based on Member State law or contract), or exercise other 
rights in the GDPR.145  
1. Broader possibilities with the right of access 
The requirement for notification prior to processing applies only to the 
notification duties.146 In contrast, the right of access147 can be invoked at 
any time by the data subject, opening up the possibility of providing 
                                               
also in line with the Bara and others judgment of the ECJ (C-201/14; 1.10.2015) which 
will have major implication for the GDPR as it shows that the court views prior 
notification of data transfer as essential). The ruling said that when information is 
gathered from a third party and transferred to another data controller for further 
processing (e.g. based on Member State law) prior notification of the data subject — 
even if no consent is required — is essential. Not least because it enables the exercise of 
Art. 15 (right of access) and Art. 16 (right to data rectification) as soon as data is 
collected.  
139 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 85, at 24-5. 
140 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 22(2)(a), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 46 (EU). 
141 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 22(2)(b), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 46 (EU). 
142 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 22(2)(c), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 46 (EU). 
143 Franck, supra note 95, at 326–28. 
144 On the importance to inform the data subject accurately (e.g., risks, safeguards, rights, 
consequences, etc.) to allow for informed/explicit consent, see generally JAY, supra note 
96, at 218; Heckmann & Paschke, supra note 92, at 374–75; Schulz, supra note 95, at 
418–19; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 85, at 12-3. 
145 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 10/2004 on More Harmonised 
Information Provisions (Nov. 25, 2004), 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/dec/wp100.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2DW-4F9Q] 
(describing the need to provide meaningful information (to raise awareness) about data 
collection and the need to move away from long privacy statements); see also Heckmann 
& Paschke, supra note 92, at 388–89. 
146 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, arts. 13 & 14 2016 O.J. (L 119) 40–42 (EU). 
147 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 15, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43 (EU). 
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information available after a decision has been made (i.e., the reasons for 
a specific decision). However, scholars have argued that the information 
supplied via notification duties and the right of access is largely identical, 
meaning the right of access is similarly limited in terms of the scope of 
“meaningful information about the logic involved as well as the 
significance and the envisaged consequences.”148 Information can thus 
largely be provided with identical tools (e.g., generic icons, privacy 
statements)149 or generic templates150 used for both notification and in 
response to access requests.  
The narrower interpretation appears to be correct.151 The Article 
29 Working Party supports this view, explaining that the information 
requirements in Art. 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g), and 15(1)(h) are identical,152 while 
Art. 15(1)(h) requires “that the controller should provide the data subject 
with information about the envisaged consequences of the processing, 
rather than an explanation of a particular decision.”153 A similar argument 
has been made by the ICO stating that Art. 13–15 aim to “provide 
information about how profiling might affect the data subject generally, 
rather than information about a specific decision.”154 Additionally, the 
GDPR indicates a restricted scope for the right of access when compared 
to Art. 13–14. Personal data of other data subjects must not be disclosed, 
as this could infringe their privacy. Access requests can also contravene 
trade secrets or intellectual property rights (Art. 15(4) and Recital 63), 
meaning an appropriate balance between the data subject and controller’s 
interests must be struck.155  
                                               
148 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 15(1)(h), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43 (EU). 
149 Paal, supra note 131, at Rn. 31; Franck, supra note 95, at 328; Lorenz Franck, DS-
GVO Art. 15 Auskunftsrecht der betroffenen Person, in DATENSCHUTZ-
GRUNDVERORDNUNG VO (EU) 2016/679 348, 349–50 (Peter Gola ed., 1st ed. 2017); 
Heckmann & Paschke, supra note 92, at 382–83. 
150 Franck, supra note 95, at 320 argues templates will be helpful, because as soon as 
Art. 15 is lodged data controllers have to inform about all the information in Art. 15, 
regardless of the actual request. See also Ehmann, supra note 119, at 431–32. 
151 See Wachter, Mittelstadt & Floridi, supra note 1; Michael Veale & Lilian Edwards, 
Clarity, Surprises, and Further Questions in the Article 29 Working Party Draft 
Guidance on Automated Decision-Making and Profiling, COMPUT. L. & SECURITY REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 3), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3071679 
[https://perma.cc/Z37Z-TM3W]. 
152 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 85, at 26-7. 
153 Id. at 27. 
154 The intention of Art. 15 is to provide a control mechanism for data subjects to request 
at any time more or less the same information as Art. 13–14, without having to rely on 
legal compliance with the notification duties by data controllers. Ehmann, supra note 
119, 426–427; Info. Comm’r’s Office, supra note 112, at 16. 
155 Franck, supra note 149, 355; Ehmann, supra note 119, at 434–435. 
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2. Understanding through counterfactuals 
Counterfactual explanations meet and exceed the aims and requirements 
of the GDPR’s transparency mechanisms156, notification duties157, and 
right of access158, which provide data subjects with information to 
understand the scope of automated decision-making. As argued above, 
Recital 71 does not give any clear indication of the intended purpose or 
content of explanations, including whether the internal logic of the 
algorithm must be explained. By providing simple “if-then” statements, 
counterfactuals align with the requirement to communicate information 
to data subjects in a “concise, transparent, intelligible and easily 
accessible form.”159 They simultaneously provide greater insight into the 
data subject’s personal situation and the reasons behind relevant 
automated decisions than an overview tailored to a general audience. 
Counterfactuals are also less likely to infringe on trade secrets or the rights 
and freedoms of others (e.g., privacy), since no data of other data subjects 
or detailed information about the algorithm needs to be disclosed, in line 
with restrictions on the right of access.160  
Perhaps most importantly, counterfactuals offer an explanation of 
some of the rationale of specific automated decisions, without needing to 
explain the internal logic of how a decision was reached (beyond a 
specific, limited set of dependencies between variables and the decision). 
This type of information is in line with the guidance mentioned above 
from the Article 29 Working Party161 and the UK’s ICO.162 While opening 
the black box is not legally required, some information about the “logic 
involved” in automated decision-making must be provided.163 Under the 
Data Protection Directive’s right of access, disclosing the algorithm’s 
source code, formula, weights, full set of variables, and information about 
reference groups has generally not been required.164 The GDPR’s right of 
access is likely to present similar requirements. Counterfactuals largely 
follow this precedent by disclosing only the influence of select external 
                                               
156 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 12, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 39–40 (EU). 
157 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, arts. 13 & 14, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 40–42 (EU). 
158 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 15, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43 (EU). 
159 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 12(1), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 39 (EU). 
160 See Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, recital 63 & art. 15(4), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 12, 43 
(EU). 
161 See generally Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 85. 
162 See generally Info. Comm’r’s Office, supra note 112. 
163 See Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, arts. 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g) & 15(1)(h), 2016 O.J. (L 
119) 41–43 (EU). 
164 For an in-depth analysis of this jurisprudence, see generally Wachter, Mittelstadt & 
Floridi, supra note 1. 
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facts and variables on a specific decision. Although Art. 13(2)(f), Art. 
14(2)(g), and Art. 15(1)(h) do not require information about specific 
decisions,165 counterfactuals represent a minimal form of disclosure to 
inform the data subject about the “logic involved” in specific decisions. 
This form of disclosure regulatory burden for data controllers is 
minimised, as resolving the technical difficulties of interpretability or 
explaining the internal logic of complex systems to non-experts is not 
required to compute and communicate counterfactual explanations. 
Counterfactuals can thus be recommended as a minimally burdensome 
and disruptive technique to help data subjects understand the rationale of 
specific decisions beyond the explicit legal requirements of Art. 13(2)(f), 
Art. 14(2)(g), and Art. 15(1)(h). 
B. EXPLANATIONS TO CONTEST DECISIONS 
Another possible purpose of explanations is to provide information that 
helps contest automated decisions when an adverse or otherwise 
undesired decision is received. A right to contest decisions is provided as 
a safeguard against automated decision-making in Art. 22(3).  
Contesting a decision can aim to reverse or nullify the decision 
and return to a status where no decision has been made, or to alter the 
result and receive an alternative decision. If the reasons that led to a 
decision need to be explained, the affected party can assess whether these 
reasons were legitimate and contest the assessment as required.  
How a decision can be contested depends on whether the 
safeguards in Art. 22(3) (i.e., rights to obtain human intervention, express 
views, and contest the decision) are interpreted as a unit that must be 
invoked together, or as individual rights that can be invoked separately or 
in any possible combination.166 To gauge the scope of explanations 
according to their purpose and aim, different possible models for 
contesting an automated decision need to be assessed. 
Four models are possible. If the safeguards are a unit and must be 
invoked together, it is likely that some human involvement is necessary 
to issue a new decision. This could either be a human making the decision 
without any algorithmic help, hence the new result is a human decision 
rather than an automated decision. Alternatively, a person could be 
required to make a decision taking the algorithmic assessment and/or the 
data subject’s objections into account, which would be human assessment 
                                               
165 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 85, at 26-7. 
166 See Martini, supra note 85. 
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with algorithmic elements. In both cases data subjects would lose their 
safeguards against the subsequent decision, as both types of decision are 
not based “solely on automated processing” and thus do not meet the 
definition of automated individual decisions in Art. 22(1).167 Another 
possibility is that a person could be required to monitor the input data and 
processing (e.g., based on the data subject’s objections), with a new 
decision made solely by the algorithmic system. In this case the Art. 22(3) 
safeguards still apply to the new decision.168 Finally, if the safeguards can 
be separated, and data subjects can invoke their right to contest the 
decision without invoking their right to obtain human intervention or 
express their views, a new decision could be issued with no human 
involvement. This decision could be contested again under Art. 22(3). It 
is unclear which of these models will be preferred following 
implementation of the GDPR.169 
The question remains what explanations would be helpful to 
contest decisions. This will depend on the contesting model. The first 
model where a human makes a new decision and disregards everything 
the algorithm suggested, an explanation of the rationale of the original 
decision could be informative, but will not practically impact the new 
decision made entirely by a human decision-maker. For each of the other 
models, where algorithmic involvement is envisioned, an explanation of 
the rationale of the decision could be helpful to identify potential grounds 
                                               
167 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 22, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 46 (EU). 
168 However, if the new automated decision is communicated to the data subject by a 
person, it may not be considered “solely automated” and not subject to the Art 22(3) 
safeguards. The precise limitations on “solely automated” in Art 22(1) remain unclear. 
See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 85, at 10 (explaining that 
fabricated human involvement should not be used as a loophole). 
169 Either interpretation is possible, as indicated by the European Parliament's proposal 
to add the following text to Article 20 in an earlier draft of the GDPR, “[t]he suitable 
measures to safeguard the data subject's legitimate interests referred to in paragraph 2 
shall include the right to obtain human assessment and an explanation of the decision 
reached after such assessment.” This text clarified that a human would need to assess the 
decision in question. However, this text was not adopted in the end, which leaves 
implementation of any of the four models possible. With that said, treating the safeguards 
as individually enforceable may be the most sensible option. Individuals can have an 
interest in expressing their views or obtaining human intervention when a decision is 
poorly understood or misunderstood. Both interests do not, however, necessarily lead to 
challenging the decision, particularly if challenges are costly or have a low likelihood of 
success. 
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for contesting, such as inaccuracies in the input data, problematic 
inferences, or other flaws in the algorithmic reasoning.170  
Even though an explanation of the rationale of a decision could be 
helpful to contest decisions, it does not imply an explanation is required 
by the GDPR or is the intended aim of the non-binding right to 
explanation.171 Recital 71 does not specify the aim of the right or what 
information should be revealed, and does not explicitly require the 
algorithm’s internal logic to be explained. An explicit link is not 
established in the GDPR between the right to explanation and the right to 
contest, wherein the former would provide information necessary to 
exercise the latter.172 Further, there is no reason to assume that the 
safeguards in Art. 22(3) must be exercised together, rather than 
independently of one another. Therefore, explanations under Recital 71 
are not a necessary precondition to contest unfavourable decisions, even 
though this might be helpful. 
Similarly, an explicit link has not been made between the right to 
contest and the transparency mechanisms,173 notification duties,174 right 
of access,175 meaning the information provided through these rights and 
duties need not be explicitly tailored to help data subjects successfully 
contest decisions.176  
Nonetheless, information provided by Art. 12–15 may be helpful 
for contesting. Support is evident in the fact that notification duties aim 
to facilitate the exercise of other rights in the GDPR to increase individual 
control over personal data processing.177 To achieve this, Art. 13(2)(b), 
14(2)(c), and 15(1)(e) obligate data controllers to inform data subjects 
                                               
170  Brent Mittelstadt et al., The Ethics of Algorithms: Mapping the Debate, BIG DATA 
SOC. (2016), http://bds.sagepub.com/lookup/doi/10.1177/2053951716679679 
[https://perma.cc/YB4Y-9MXD]. 
171 See Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, recital 71, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 14 (EU). 
172 See Hladjk, supra note 79, at 535–536; Schulz, supra note 95, 419–420 (arguing that 
“contesting” and “explaining” the decision are separate and independent safeguards). 
173 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 12, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 39–40 (EU). 
174 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, arts. 13 & 14, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 40–42 (EU). 
175 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 15, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43 (EU). 
176 At the same time, the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party argues that 
transparency in processing is essential to contesting, and that the reasons for the 
decisions and the legitimate basis should be known. See Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party, supra note 85, at 27. However, the guidelines leave open whether this 
requires opening the black box and disclosing the algorithm. See id. This seems unlikely 
as the guidelines state that not even Art. 15(1)(h) aims to offer an explanation about an 
individual decision. See id. at 27. Hence it can be assumed that the information provided 
does not need to include an explanation of the internal logic of a specific decision. 
177 See Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 12(2), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 40 (EU). 
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about their rights in Art. 15–21178 at the time when the data is collected,179 
within one month when obtained from a third party,180 or at any time if 
requested by the data subject.181 However, Art. 22 appears not to be 
covered by these provisions due to the odd phrasing of the obligation to 
inform of “the existence of automated decision-making, including 
profiling, referred to in Art. 22(1) and (4) and, at least in those cases, 
meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the 
significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing for the 
data subject.”182 
As argued above, Art. 13–15 will provide a meaningful overview 
of automated decision-making tailored to a general audience. On the 
surface, such an overview is not immediately useful for contesting 
decisions, as information about the rationale of individual decisions is not 
provided. In describing information to be provided about automated 
decision-making, these Articles explicitly refer only to Art. 22(1) and (4). 
It follows that data subjects do not need to be informed about the 
safeguards against automated decision-making such as the right to 
contest.183 This limitation is telling. If the aim of Art. 13–15 were to 
facilitate contesting decisions by providing useful, individual-level 
information, one would expect the right to contest or Art. 22(3) to be 
explicitly discussed. Similarly, Art. 13–15 seem not require to inform the 
data subject about their right not to be subject to an automated individual 
decision,184 from which a right to contest decisions could be inferred.185 
                                               
178 See Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 15, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43 (EU). If invoked via 
Art. 15(1)(e), data controllers only have to inform about the rights enshrined in Art. 16, 
17, 18, 19, and 21. 
179 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 13, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 40–41 (EU). 
180 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 14(3)(a), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 42 (EU). 
181 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 15, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43 (EU). 
182 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 15(1)(h), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43 (EU). 
183 See Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 22(3), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 46 (EU); Schulz, supra 
note 95, 419–420 (arguing that data controllers only have to inform about the safeguards 
after an adverse decision has been issued). In fact, Art. 12(3) introduces a very 
complicated model where the data controller has to inform upon request what kind of 
measures have been taken to satisfy a request under Art. 15–22, without being informed 
about the safeguards beforehand. See also, Martini, supra note 85, at Rn. 39–40 (also 
acknowledging this loophole). 
184 See Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 22(1), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 46 (EU). 
185 It is important to note that Art. 13–15 obligate to inform about the general right to 
object to processing (which forces data controllers to stop processing) in Art. 21. 
Together with the information about the legitimate basis for processing provided in Art. 
13(1)(c) and Art. 14(1)(c), this information could be used to contest decisions. However, 
this arrangement may place an unreasonable burden on the data subject. Contesting 
should be made as easy as possible, not least because the chances of successfully forcing 
the data controller to stop processing under Art. 21 are different from under Art. 22. For 
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In fact, in an earlier draft of the GDPR it was suggested that the 
information rights should refer to Art. 20 as a whole.186 Ultimately, this 
approach was not adopted, suggesting that the lack of useful information 
for contesting decisions was intentional. 
This lack of an explicit link to the safeguards against automated 
decision-making is in many ways unsurprising. Art. 12–15 aim to inform 
data subjects about the existence of their rights in the GDPR,187 and to 
facilitate their exercise.188 This does not, however, mean that the 
controller is required to provide other information to help the data subject 
to exercise her rights.189 Rather, the data subject only needs to be informed 
about the existence of her rights, and provided with the necessary 
infrastructure for their exercise190 (e.g., web portals for complaints), 
including the elimination of unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles,191 a 
guarantee of reasonable response time to queries lodged192 as stated in 
Art. 12(3), and the opportunity to interact with someone who has the 
power to change the decision.193 However, the data subject remains 
responsible to exercise her rights independently.194 As one commentator 
notes, Art. 15 does not create a duty to legal consultancy;195 rather, it is 
sufficient that the data controllers inform about the existing rights in the 
GDPR. Unfortunately, Recital 60, which vaguely states that “any further 
information necessary to ensure fair and transparent processing taking 
into account the specific circumstances and context in which the personal 
data are processed” should be provided to the data subject, does not offer 
                                               
example, legitimate interest of data controller can trump a data subject right to object to 
data processing under Art. 21. However, Art. 22 does not allow automated decision-
making on the basis of legitimate interest of the data controller (only explicit consent, 
law, or contract). This information will be useful for a data subject if they want to prevent 
data controllers from making decisions or to contest decisions. See Regulation 2016/679, 
GDPR, arts. 13–15 & 21–22, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 40–43, 45–46 (EU). 
186 See EUROPEAN DIGITAL RIGHTS, COMPARISON OF THE PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL 
TEXT ON THE GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION 131 (2016), 
https://edri.org/files/EP_Council_Comparison.pdf [https://perma.cc/CY6H-P97Z]. 
187 See Knyrim, supra note 98, 415–416. 
188 See Heckmann & Paschke, supra note 92, at 371–372; Ehmann, supra note 119, at 
425. 
189 See Heckmann & Paschke, supra note 92, at 378–379 (articulating that easily 
understood information provided about data subject rights in Art. 15–22 is sufficient to 
facilitate their exercise).  
190 See Bensoussan, supra note 98, at 114. 
191 See Heckmann & Paschke, supra note 92, at 379–380. 
192 See Franck, supra note 95, at 323–324. 
193 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 85, at 21. 
194 See Heckmann & Paschke, supra note 92, at 379–380. 
195 Franck, supra note 149, at 352. 
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additional assistance to the data subject.196 This provision was 
intentionally moved to the non-binding Recitals during trilogue 
negotiations.197 Data controllers thus do not have a legal obligation to 
provide information that will be particularly useful for the data subject to 
exercise her other rights.  
One final comparable restriction is notable concerning Art. 16, the 
right for the data subject to rectify inaccurate personal data. Data 
controllers are not required to specify which records most influenced a 
specific automated decision, which could be extremely helpful to a data 
subject attempting to identify inaccuracies as grounds to contest a 
decision. If large amounts of personal data are held, then the subject may 
have to check tens of thousands of items for inaccuracies.  
1. Contesting through counterfactuals 
Art. 13–15 thus do little to facilitate a data subject’s ability to challenge 
automated decisions. Information is not provided about the safeguards in 
Art. 22(3) (e.g., the right to contest). It appears that data subjects do not 
need to be informed of their right not to be subject to an automated 
decision, which itself could imply a right to contest objectionable 
automated decisions. Similarly, Recital 71 has neither an explicit link to 
contesting decisions nor to understanding the black box. Even though an 
explanation could be helpful, they do not appear to be intended as a 
precondition for challenging decisions. If explanations were a 
precondition for contesting decisions, they would appear in the legally 
binding text.  To offer greater protection to data subjects, these 
information gaps should be closed, meaning data controllers should 
inform about the right not to be subject to an automated decision and its 
safeguards. However, each of these seemingly intentional limitations on 
the information provided to data subjects suggests that information about 
                                               
196 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, recital 60, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 12 (EU). 
197 The European Commission, European Council, and European Parliament in Art. 
14(1)(h) proposed to create a legal duty for data controllers to provide any further 
information beyond those in the notification duties to ensure fair and transparent data 
processing. See generally EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Regulation of the European 
Parliament and the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data 
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protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HSG-
9HX7]; EUROPEAN DIGITAL RIGHTS, supra note 186, at 126–127, 129. However, this 
proposal was not adopted and moved to Recital 60, suggesting that there is no legal duty 
to provide more information than required in Art 13–14; see Franck, supra note 99, at 
337. 
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the internal logic of an automated decision-making system (in compliance 
with “meaningful information about the logic involved as well as the 
significance and the envisaged consequences” in Art. 13(2)(4), 14(2)(g), 
and 15(1)(h)), which could facilitate contesting decisions, does not need 
to be provided.198  
Given these restrictions, counterfactuals could be helpful for 
contesting decisions, and thus provide greater protection for the data 
subject than currently envisioned by the GDPR. Regardless of the legal 
status of the right to explanation, the right to contest is a legally binding 
safeguard.199 By providing information about the external factors and key 
variables that contributed to a specific decision, counterfactuals can 
provide valuable information for data subjects to exercise their right to 
contest. This would also be in line with the guidelines of the Article 29 
Working Party, which urge that understanding decisions and knowing 
their legal basis is essential for contesting decisions, and is not necessarily 
linked to opening the black box.200 An explanation that low-income led to 
a loan application being declined could, for example, help the data subject 
contest the outcome on the grounds of inaccurate or incomplete data 
regarding her financial situation. Understanding the internal logic of the 
system that led to income being considered a relevant variable in the 
decision, which would require a technical explanation unlike a 
counterfactual explanation (see Appendix 1), may be desirable in its own 
right, but is not absolutely necessary to contest the decision based on that 
variable. 
Counterfactuals offer a solution and support for contesting 
decisions by providing data subjects with information about the reasons 
for a decision, without the need to open the black box. Although Art. 16 
of the GDPR gives the data subject the right to correct inaccurate data 
used to make a decision, the data subject does not need to be informed 
which data the decision depended. Where a large corpus of data has been 
collected, an individual without knowledge of which data is relevant or 
most influential on a particular decision is forced to vet all of it. This lack 
of information increases the burden on data subjects seeking a different 
outcome. Counterfactuals provide a compact and easy way to convey 
these dependencies (i.e., which data was influential), and to facilitate 
effective claims that a decision was made on the basis of inaccurate data 
and contest it. 
                                               
198 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 15(1)(h), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43 (EU). 
199 Regulation 2016/679, GDPR, art. 22(3), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 46 (EU). 
200 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 85, at 25, 27. 
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C. EXPLANATIONS TO ALTER FUTURE DECISIONS 
From the view of the data subject, alongside understanding and contesting 
decisions, explanations can also be useful to indicate what could be 
changed to receive a desired result in the future. This purpose does not 
necessarily relate to the right to contest. Accurate decisions can produce 
unfavourable results for the data subject. The chances of successfully 
challenging the decision will also be low in some cases, or the costs and 
effort required too high. In these situations, the data subject may prefer to 
change aspects of her situation by adapting her behaviour, and requesting 
a new decision once more favourable conditions exist.  
Using explanations as a guide to altering behaviour to receive a 
desired automated decision is not directly addressed in the GDPR. This 
does not, however, undermine the interest data subjects have in receiving 
desired results from automated decision-making systems. For example, if 
a subject was rejected for a loan due to insufficient income, a 
counterfactual explanation will indicate if reapplying in the event of an 
immediate pay rise is reasonable. The Article 29 Working Party seems to 
agree, stating in relevant guidelines that “tips on how to improve these 
habits and consequently how to lower insurance premiums” could be 
useful for the data subject.201 For reasons outlined in Appendix 1, 
technical explanations that try to provide “meaningful information about 
the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged 
consequences” of automated decision-making are not guaranteed to be 
useful in this situation.202  
Counterfactuals can thus be useful for altering future decisions in 
favour of the data subject. By providing information about key variables 
and “close possible worlds” which result in a different decision, data 
subjects can understand which factors could be changed to receive the 
desired result. For decision-making models and environments with low 
variability over time, or models that are “artificially frozen” in time for 
individuals (i.e., future decisions will be made with the same model as the 
individual’s original decision), this information can help the data subject 
to alter her behaviour or situation to receive her desired result in the 
future. Similarly, data controllers could contractually agree to provide the 
data subject with the preferred outcome if the terms of a given 
counterfactual were met within a specified period of time. 
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With that said, unanticipated dependencies between intentionally 
changed attributes and other variables, such as an increase in income 
resulting from a change in career, may undermine the utility of 
counterfactuals as guides for future behaviour. Counterfactual 
explanations can, however, address the impact of changes to more than 
one variable on a model’s output at the same time. Further, regardless of 
the utility of counterfactuals as guidance for future behaviour, their ability 
to help individuals understand which data and variables were influential 
in specific prior decisions remains unaffected. 
CONCLUSION 
We have proposed a novel lightweight form of explanation that we refer 
to as counterfactual explanations. Unlike existing approaches that try to 
provide insight into the internal logic of black box algorithms, 
counterfactual explanations do not attempt to clarify how decisions are 
made internally. Instead, they provide insight into which external facts 
could be different in order to arrive at a desired outcome.203 Importantly, 
counterfactual explanations are efficiently computable for many standard 
classifiers, particularly neural networks.  As our new form of explanation 
significantly differs from existing works, we have justified its nature as 
an explanation with reference to previous works in the philosophical 
literature and early A.I. 
From the view of the data subject, we have assessed three purposes 
of explanations of automated decisions: understanding, contesting and 
altering. We compared these aims with the provisions of the GDPR and 
evaluated if they rely upon opening the black box. We concluded that the 
framework offers little support to achieve these goals, and does not 
mandate that algorithms are explainable to understand, contest or alter 
decisions.  
The GDPR itself provides little insight into the intended purpose 
and content of explanations. Recital 71, the only provision that explicitly 
mentions explanations, does not reveal their intended purpose or content. 
Given the final text of the GDPR, it appears that explanations can 
voluntarily be offered after decisions have been made, and are not a 
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required precondition to contest decisions. Further, there is no clear link 
that suggests that explanations under Recital 71 require opening the black 
box. 
Recognising this relative lack of insight into explanations, related 
provisions addressing automated decision-making were examined. 
Notification duties defined in Art. 13–14 apply prior to data processing or 
before a decision is made (i.e. at the time of data collection), and provide 
a simple and generic overview of intended data processing activities that 
aims to inform a general audience.204 This type of “meaningful overview” 
of automated decision-making is largely unsuitable to understand the 
rationale of specific decisions. Art. 13–14 similarly do not facilitate 
contesting decisions, owing to a lack of information to be provided about 
the right not to be subject to automated individual decision-making,205 and 
its safeguards.206 The right of access207 provides nearly identical 
information to Art. 13–14, and thus offers similarly limited value for 
understanding and contesting decisions. The rights and freedoms of others 
(e.g. privacy or trade secrets) which are protected in Art. 15(4) and Recital 
63 pose an additional barrier to transparency when access requests are 
lodged. Across each of these Articles, technical explanations of the 
internal logic of automated decision-making systems are not legally 
mandated. Finally, offering explanations to give guidance how to receive 
the desired result in the future does not appear to be an aim of the GDPR, 
but could still be highly useful for individuals seeking alternative, more 
desirable outcomes. 
Any future attempt to implement a legally binding right to 
explanation as a safeguard against automated decision-making within the 
framework provided by the GDPR faces several notable challenges. 
Automated decision-making must be based “solely on automated 
processing,” and have “legal effects” or similarly significant effects.208 
Additionally, exemptions from the safeguards against automated 
decision-making can be introduced through Member State law.209  
However, the data subject’s desire to understand, contest, and alter 
decisions does not change based on these definitional issues. We therefore 
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propose to move past the limitation of the GDPR and to use 
counterfactuals as unconditional explanations. These unconditional 
explanations should be given whenever requested, regardless of outcome 
(positive or negative decision), whether the decision was based on solely 
automated processes and their (legal or similar significant) effects.  
Counterfactual explanations could be implemented in several 
ways. The transience of decision-making models suggests that 
counterfactuals either need to be computed automatically at the time a 
decision is made, or a copy of the model archived to compute 
counterfactuals at a later time. As multiple outcomes based on changes to 
multiple variables may be possible, a diverse set of counterfactual 
explanations should be provided, corresponding to different choices of 
nearby possible worlds for which the counterfactual holds. These sets 
could be disclosed when automated decision-making occurs, or in 
response to specific requests lodged by individuals or a trusted third party 
auditor.210 In any case, disclosures should occur in a reasonable window 
of time.211  
Future research should determine appropriate distance metrics and 
requirements for a sufficient and relevant set of counterfactuals across use 
sectors and cases which have very different needs. While prior 
philosophical debate may prove helpful, the absence of causal models in 
most modern classifiers, as well as the preferences of the recipient(s) of 
the set, must be accounted for in choosing appropriate metrics and 
requirements. Compared to prior discussion of measuring “closest 
possible worlds,” setting requirements for appropriate “close possible 
worlds” represents a very different philosophical, social, and legal 
challenge. 
To minimise bureaucratic burdens for data controllers and delays 
for data subjects and third party auditors, automated calculation and 
disclosure of counterfactuals would be preferable. We recommend this 
type of automated implementation going forward. One possible approach 
is to provide individuals or third party auditors with access to “auditing 
APIs,”212 which allow users to request counterfactual explanations from 
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212 Who would shoulder the costs of hosting these APIs and computing counterfactuals 
is an important political issue that would require resolution. This issue goes beyond the 
scope of this paper. For related discussion of implementing algorithmic auditing, see 
Christian Sandvig et al., Auditing Algorithms: Research Methods for Detecting 
Discrimination on Internet Platforms, DATA & DISCRIMINATION: CONVERTING 
CRITICAL CONCERNS INTO PRODUCTIVE INQUIRY (May 22, 2014), 
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the service provider, and perhaps compute them directly via the API. 
Access to historical decision-making models used for the decision at 
hand, as well as permissive terms of service that allow for such auditing, 
would be required.213 This functionality could potentially be embedded in 
existing APIs.  
Counterfactual explanations provide reasons why a particular 
decision was received (e.g., low income), offer grounds to contest it (e.g., 
if the data controller used inaccurate data about the income of the 
applicant), and provide limited “advice” on how to receive the desired 
results in the future (e.g., an increase of 4000 pounds/year would have 
resulted in a positive application). Their usage would help to resolve two 
primary objections to a legally binding right to explanation: first, that 
explaining the internal logic of automated systems to experts and non-
experts alike is a highly difficult and perhaps intractable challenge; and 
second, that an excessive disclosure of information about the internal 
logic of a system could infringe on the rights of others, either by revealing 
protected trade secrets or by violating the privacy of individuals whose 
data is contained in the training dataset. In contrast, counterfactuals allow 
an individual to receive explanations without conveying the internal logic 
of the algorithmic black box (beyond a limited set of dependencies), and 
are less likely to infringe the rights and freedoms of others than full 
disclosure. Assuming reasonable limitations are set on the number of 
counterfactuals that must be provided, counterfactuals are also less likely 
to provide information that reveals trade secrets or allows gaming of 
decision-making systems. 
As a minimal form of explanation, counterfactuals are not 
appropriate in all scenarios. In particular, where it is important to 
understand system functionality, or the rationale of an automated 
decision, counterfactuals may be insufficient in themselves. Further, 
counterfactuals do not provide the statistical evidence needed to assess 
algorithms for fairness or racial bias. Given these limitations, more 
general forms of explanations and interpretability should still be pursued 
                                               
http://social.cs.uiuc.edu/papers/pdfs/ICA2014-Sandvig.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NKH-
J69E]; Brent Mittelstadt, Auditing for Transparency in Content Personalization Systems, 
10 INT’L. J. COMM. 12 (2016) http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/6267 
[https://perma.cc/TCN4-56QU].  
213 Counterfactuals must be computed on the basis of the decision-making model at the 
time the decision was taken. Assuming automated decision-making models change over 
time, in implementations not involving automatic computation of counterfactuals at the 
time a decision is made (which may be cost prohibitive), it will be necessary for data 
controllers to keep ‘audit logs’ indicating the state of the decision-making model at the 
time of the decision.  
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to increase accountability and better validate the fairness and functionality 
of systems.  
However, counterfactuals represent an easy first step that balances 
transparency, explainability, and accountability with other interests such 
as minimising the regulatory burden on business interest or preserving the 
privacy of others, while potentially increasing public acceptance of 
automatic decisions. Rather than waiting years for jurisprudence to 
dissolve all these uncertainties, we propose to abandon the narrow 
definitions and conditions the GDPR imposes on automated decision-
making, and offer counterfactuals as unconditional explanations at the 
request of affected individuals.  
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APPENDIX 1: SIMPLE LOCAL MODELS AS EXPLANATIONS 
As discussed in Section II.B, ‘Explanations in A.I. and Machine 
Learning,’ approaches such as LIME214 that generate simple models as 
local approximations of decisions make a three-way trade-off between the 
quality of the approximation versus the ease of understanding the function 
and the size of the domain for which the approximation is valid.215 
To illustrate the instabilities of the approach with respect to the 
size of the domain, we consider a simple function of one variable.  Even 
for problems such as this, the notion of scale, or how large a region should 
an explanation try to describe, is challenging with the ideal choice of scale 
depending on what the explanation would be used for. 
As a real-world example, consider being stopped by someone in a 
car who asks which direction they should travel in to go north. 
Fundamentally, this is a difficult question to answer well, with the most 
appropriate answer depending upon how far north they wish to travel. If 
they do not intend to travel far, simply pointing north gives them enough 
information. However, if they intend to travel further, roads that initially 
point north may double back on themselves or be cul-de-sacs and better 
directions are needed. If they intend to travel a long way, they may be 
better off ignoring the compass bearing entirely, and instead try to directly 
join up with an inter-city network. 
This exact issue is faced when automating explanations of 
decisions: the generated explanations are generic, and designed to be 
useful to the recipient of the explanation regardless of how they are used. 
However, as shown in Figure 1, the explanation — or simplified model 
— can vary wildly with the scale or range of inputs considered. 
  
                                               
214 See Ribeiro, Singh, & Guestrin, supra note 14. 
215 See Bastani, Kim & Bastani, supra note 13; Lakkaraju et al., supra note 47. 
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Figure 1 - Local models varying with choice of scale. The red line in 
each subfigure shows a local approximation of the same blue score 
curve centred at the same location in each plot. The varying range over 
which the approximation is computed is given by the region marked by 
black bars. Different choices of range e.g. top left vs. bottom left can 
lead to completely opposing explanations where the score either 
increases or decreases as the value along the bottom axis increase. 
As can be seen, the direction and magnitude of the linear approximation 
(red) to underlying function (blue) vary dramatically with choice of 
domain, and deciding which approximation is most helpful to a 
layperson trying to understand the decision made about them is non-
trivial.  
To show the difficulties that would exist in either trying to use 
local models to either compute counterfactuals, or simply for the data 
subject to adjust their score, we assume that the subject desired to know 
how to obtain a lower score of -10 or below. In this case, none of the local 
approximations would be useful. The top left model, which is based on 
exact description of the function around point x predicts that a score of -
10 would be obtained with a value of -2.5—corresponding to an actual 
score of 91.5, while the two centre approximations suggest that it is not 
possible to obtain any score except 0, and the bottom left approximation 
says that -10 occurs at near 0.9—which actually corresponds to a local 
maxima. 
In contrast, the counterfactual explanation for a query such as 
“Why was the score not below -10?” would return the answer “Because 
the x value was not 2.15” (the counterfactual is illustrated in figure 2 by 
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the green dot). Of course, it should be noted that the two approaches are 
generally incomparable. In much the same way, if a data subject desired 
to know a local linear approximation about their data point, knowledge of 
counterfactuals would not be helpful. However, of the two approaches, 
counterfactuals are the only one that will provide some indication if it is 
worth reapplying for a loan in the event of a pay rise. 
 
 
Figure 2 – Visual representation of the range of a counterfactual 
explanation 
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APPENDIX 2: EXAMPLE TRANSPARENCY INFOGRAPHIC 
The figure below shows several icons proposed by the European 
Parliament during trilogue that were ultimately not adopted as a standard. 
They nonetheless reveal the level of complexity expected by EU 
legislators when communicating information to data subjects under Art. 
13–14.  The reliance on generic icons suggests that individual-level, 
contextualised information is not required, meaning Art. 13–14 are not 
intended to provide a ‘de facto’ right to explanation comparable to the 
right contained in Recital 71. The relative simplicity of the icons also 
suggests that a broad audience is intended, comparable for example to 
website privacy notices. Finally, although the icons were rejected, the EC 
has been tasked with developing such standardised icons in the future 
(Art. 12(8)), meaning comparable icons are seen as an acceptable way to 
convey the information required by Art. 13–14. 
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